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ABSTRACT 
Social intrapreneurs occupy an intersectional space within the large 
corporate form at the crossroads of innovation, profit, and social 
good. They are often described as “disruptive” because they devise 
new ways to tackle problems, usually social in nature, in a manner 
that disrupts traditional operating models or long-standing 
assumptions. Although much has been written about social 
intrapreneurs in managerial literature, legal literature has been silent. 
This Article reverses that trend and develops a theory of social 
intrapreneurship from a corporate law perspective. Specifically, this 
Article posits that social intrapreneurship in terms of praxis, 
characteristics, and process can be conceptualized as serving a 
bridging function between discrete parts of a corporation’s business 
and, on a meta-level, between the canonical schism of “profit” and 
“social good.” 
To be clear, the argument advanced in this Article is not that social 
intrapreneurship is the antidote to all corporate ills, but rather that in 
its most successful form, social intrapreneurship redefines the 
boundaries of a corporation’s business and social potential.  Social 
intrapreneurship has implications for broader policy debates, such as 
those related to matters of corporate purpose, the choice of 
organizational forms, and the need for tri-sector cooperation. 
INTRODUCTION 
 little less than a decade ago, two employees at Vodafone PLC 
noted a disconnect—although half of the population in Kenya A
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had mobile phones, less than 20% of Kenyans had access to formal 
banking services.1 Struck by this gap, Vodafone employees Nick 
Hughes and Susie Lonie ideated an innovative mobile banking 
network called “M-PESA” that allowed Kenyans to perform banking 
activities via their mobile phones.2 M-PESA’s success has been 
twofold: first, it effectively opened up access to banking services 
without the need to build brick-and-mortar banks, and second, it 
contributed to Vodafone’s financial bottom line.3 
Vodafone’s story does not stand alone. At many large for-profit 
corporations, such as Dow Chemicals Co., Unilever Inc., and Danone 
SA, individuals like Nick and Susie exist.4 Often termed “social 
intrapreneurs,” these employees spot gaps between intra-firm 
capabilities and extra-firm societal needs, and create new products, 
services, and/or practices that link business growth and profitability 
with social value creation. 
Social intrapreneurship has attracted a lot of attention in business 
literature, as well as in media and corporate circles.5 For example, a 
2014 Forbes article described social intrapreneurs as “quickly 
becoming the most valuable employees at many companies because 
they are good for the bottom line, good for the brand, and good for 
 
1 See IGNACIO MAS & DAN RADCLIFFE, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION, 
MOBILE PAYMENTS GO VIRAL: M-PESA IN KENYA 2 n.5 (2010), http://siteresources.world 
bank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/258643-1271798012256/M-PESA_Kenya.pdf; 
SUSTAINABILITY, THE SOCIAL INTRAPRENEUR: A FIELD GUIDE FOR CORPORATE 
CHANGEMAKERS 7 (2008), http://www.echoinggreen.org/sites/default/files/The_Social 
_Intrapreneurs.pdf. 
2 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 7. 
3 See Matt Twomey, Cashless Africa: Kenya’s Smash Success with Mobile Money, 
CNBC.COM (Nov. 11, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2013/11/11/cashless-africa  
-kenyas-smash-success-with-mobile-money.html. 
4 See infra Part I; Appendix. 
5 See GERALD F. DAVIS & CHRISTOPHER J. WHITE, CHANGING YOUR COMPANY FROM 
THE INSIDE OUT: A GUIDE FOR SOCIAL INTRAPRENEURS (2015); DAVID GRAYSON ET AL., 
SOCIAL INTRAPRENEURISM AND ALL THAT JAZZ: HOW BUSINESS INNOVATORS ARE 
HELPING TO BUILD A MORE SUSTAINABLE WORLD (2014); David Armano, Move Over 
Entrepreneurs, Here Come the Intrapreneurs, FORBES (May 21, 2012, 12:11 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/onmarketing/2012/05/21/move-over-entrepreneurs-here-come 
-the-intrapreneurs/; Scott MacFarland, Are Social Intrapreneurs Emerging in Your 
Company?, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Apr. 22, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/scott-macfarland/are-social-intrapreneurs-_b_4818701.html; Judy Samuelson, 
Social Intrapreneurs: Disruptive Innovators on the Inside, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2013, 8:00 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/skollworldforum/2013/04/07/social-intrapreneurs          
-disruptive-innovators-on-the-inside; Emma Stewart, How Does a Social Intrapreneur Add 
Value to a Business?, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.the 
guardian.com/sustainable-business/social-intrapreneur-value-business. 
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staff morale.”6 Relatedly, several corporations such as Google, Inc., 
BMW (through its foundation), and Barclays PLC have created 
processes for encouraging and supporting intrapreneurship, and a 
2008 article in The Economist speculated that social intrapreneurs 
were arguably “[t]he greatest agents for sustainable change.”7 
In addition to praising the potential value that social intrapreneurs 
bring to the corporate table, the business literature and practitioners in 
the intrapreneurship space often acknowledge and wrestle with the 
structural organizational obstacles that social intrapreneurs face.8 Of 
prime concern are organizational structure constraints that hinder 
access to resources, obtaining approval from “higher-ups” for 
initiatives as they move from ideation to development, and securing a 
viable budget. 
However, yet another structural feature that should be considered, 
but which has not received due consideration in intrapreneurial 
discussions is the effect of corporate law on intrapreneurship. 
Intrapreneurs operate within organizations, many of which are 
corporations, and by extension corporations operate within the bounds 
of corporate law. In turn corporate law provides a backdrop of rules 
and norms that govern the rights, responsibilities, and relationships of 
the board, officers, shareholders, and other constituents. Thus, 
corporate law is itself a structural feature that merits consideration. 
This Article is the first to contemplate how corporate law 
potentially impacts social intrapreneurship and, concomitantly, how 
social intrapreneurship contributes to academic discussions on the 
nature of corporations. Of particular interest to this Article is 
contemplating how corporate law’s theoretical treatment of the nature 
of the relationship between the concepts of “profit” and “social 
interest” in the context of the for-profit corporation intersects with the 
on-the-ground practice of intrapreneurship. In this regard, this Article 
argues that social intrapreneurship represents a private ordering model 
that serves a gap-filling function between axioms of “profit” and 
“social interest.” While corporate law and attendant corporate law 
 
6 Ashoka, 2014’s Most Valuable Employee: The Social Intrapreneur, FORBES (Jan. 24, 
2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2014/01/24/2014s-most-valuable    
-employee-the-social-intrapreneur/. 
7 Social Enterpreneurs: Agents of Change, ECONOMIST (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www 
.economist.com/node/10601356. 
8 Nick de Mey, Bd. of Innovation, Webinar: Experiment to Fight Red Tape: Board of 
Innovation Pays the Expenses of Corporate Intrapreneurs (Aug 18, 2015, 11:00am–
12:00pm); see also DAVIS & WHITE, supra note 5. 
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theory have always wrestled with the appropriate way to describe the 
relationship between a corporation’s profit-seeking activity and the 
social value of that activity, social intrapreneurship potentially offers 
a practical model for mediating between the two. 
This Article develops the analysis in four parts. First, Part I 
provides a descriptive overview of social-intrapreneurship activities 
based on research and analysis of a cross-section of over twenty large, 
for-profit corporations with identified social intrapreneurs.9 Part II 
considers the normative landscape in which corporations and, by 
extension, social intrapreneurs operate. As such, Part II traces the 
contours of the normative debate on corporate purpose, not with an 
eye toward resolving the debate or advocating for a particular view, 
but with the objective of demonstrating the longstanding bifurcation 
that exists between concepts of profit and public interest. Part II 
concludes by surveying current data-points (such as the rise of benefit 
corporate forms and the push for new business models like “conscious 
capitalism” or “creating shared value”), which seek to amend, 
override, or present alternatives for “opting out” of the socio-profit 
divide.10 Part III introduces and analyzes the idea of social 
intrapreneurship as serving a gap-filling function against the backdrop 
of the noted axiomatic divide between profit and social purpose. Part 
IV considers potential legal concerns presented by social 
intrapreneurship—such as the effectiveness of current fiduciary duty 
law to monitor intrapreneurial activities and the allocation of 
intellectual property rights—and contemplates potential doctrinal, 
organizational, and contractual solutions to address these concerns. 
This Article concludes by offering some thoughts on the policy 
implications of social intrapreneurship. Specifically, points of 
intersect with broader policy discussions on corporate purpose, choice 
of organizational form, and the need for corporate initiatives in 
meeting social and environmental global challenges. 
 
9 The research methodology underpinning this Article is a combination of first-hand 
interviews, literature review, and in-depth case studies. The intrapreneurs and, by 
extension, the intrapreneurial practices, analyzed in this Article have been identified as 
such by third-party organizations who are active in the intrapreneurial space. Such 
organizations include the Aspen Institute, the Skoll Foundation, Echoing Green, and the 
Ashoka Foundation. 
10 See generally JOHN MACKEY & RAJ SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING 
THE HEROIC SPIRIT OF BUSINESS (2013); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating 
Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, https://hbr.org/2011/01/the-big-idea       
-creating-shared-value. 
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The utility in examining social intrapreneurship through a 
corporate law lens is particularly salient in light of renewed interests 
by academics, policy-makers, business leaders, and the media on 
frameworks for integrating social values and sustainability into core 
business practices. 
To be clear, the argument advanced in this Article is not that social 
intrapreneurship is a silver bullet that can solve all corporate ills. 
Rather, that the practice of social intrapreneurship is a vital yet 
underexplored realm of corporate activity that provides a discrete 
means of gap-filling between structural schisms of profit and social 
interest. 
Relatedly, social intrapreneurs act as a valuable tool that allow 
their host firm to expand its mission beyond shareholders to society at 
large,11 a key characteristic that is valued by those entering the work 
force.12 In their most successful form, social intrapreneurs reimagine 
the existing boundaries of their host corporation’s potential.13 Or to 
use former Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen’s words, they 
provide a meaningful bridge between corporate law’s “alpha of 
[profit]” and the “omega of relationships.”14 
I 
SOCIAL INTRAPRENEURSHIP: PRAXIS, PROCESS, AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 
The term “intrapreneur” is often credited to Gifford Pinchot and 
Elizabeth S. Pinchot, who first used the term in a 1978 paper entitled 
Intra-Corporate Entrepreneurs.15 Today several definitions of 
“intrapreneur” and by extension “intrapreneurship” abound. While 
there is no single definition of intrapreneur or intrapreneurship, 
existing definitions all capture the idea of a corporate employee who 
 
11 See Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 789, 815 (2014) (“A firm’s mission should then inform the narrative that the firm 
develops to explain its value proposition and operational strategies to shareholders, other 
stakeholders, and society at large.”). 
12 See Jay Coen Gilbert et al., Today Marks a Tipping Point in the Evolution of 
Capitalism, FORBES (July 17, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/skoll 
worldforum/2013/07/17/today-marks-a-tipping-point-in-the-evolution-of-capitalism/print/. 
13 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 4, 5 (2008). 
14 See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 273 (1992). 
15 See Gifford Pinchot III & Elizabeth S. Pinchot, Intra-Corporate Entrepreneurship, 
INTRAPRENEUR.COM (Fall 1978), http://intrapreneur.com/MainPages/History/IntraCorp 
.html. 
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is able to reimagine the potential for their host corporation and who 
develops a product, service, and/or solution that links business growth 
to social value creation. 
For example, a 2008 report, The Social Intrapreneur: A Field 
Guide for Corporate Changemakers (the “Field Guide Report”), 
defined a social intrapreneur in three ways: (1) “[s]omeone who 
works inside major corporations or organizations to develop and 
promote practical solutions to social or environmental challenges 
where progress is currently stalled by market failures,” (2) 
“[s]omeone who applies the principles of social entrepreneurship 
inside a major organization,” and (3) “[o]ne characterized by an 
‘insider-outsider’ approach.”16 Similarly, the Aspen Institute Business 
and Society First Movers Fellowship Program defines 
intrapreneurship in relation to the employee’s demonstrated ability to 
“unite business growth with a sustainable society in the products and 
services they are developing.”17 The program identifies insiders who 
have successfully leveraged the resources and capabilities of their 
organization to create new business solutions, which add value both 
to society and to the corporation’s operations.18 
Social intrapreneurs may pursue their ideas individually or as part 
of a team. In their most successful and idealized form, social 
intrapreneurs devise products and/or solutions that deliver enhanced 
value to society and to their host corporation. The Field Guide Report 
summarized their value as follows: 
 Social intrapreneurs are creating and delivering new business 
models. They compel their host corporations to look outside their 
comfort zones—to see both the strategic risks and profound 
opportunities that exist beyond the purview of traditional business 
units. They are not satisfied with suboptimal equilibriums, where 
markets work well for some, but not at all for others. Their adept 
opposable minds exist to juggle dilemmas and catalyze new visions, 
products, services and solutions—some of which may fall beneath 
the radar today, but will eventually enable a scale of change that 
delivers value to society and business well into the future.19 
Social intrapreneurs share key traits with other innovative players, 
namely entrepreneurs and innovators. These traits include: (1) a desire 
 
16 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 4. 
17 See Aspen Institute First Movers, ASPEN INST., http://www.aspeninstitute.org/policy 
-work/business-society/corporate-programs/first-movers-fellowship-program (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2015). 
18 Id. 
19 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 5. 
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Intrapreneurs exist at various levels of a corporation’s structure, 
from the top rungs of CEO and CFO (like Whole Food’s CEO John 
Mackey) to deep within the corporation’s structure.27 A key challenge 
for the latter type of intrapreneur is that their intrapreneurial 
contributions could go hidden and unrealized without the necessary 
conduit to help bring their ideas to fruition—what the Field Guide 
Report refers to as a “gatekeeper” or “catalyst.”28 
Relatedly, because corporations understand the potential power of 
intrapreneurial activity, some corporations have institutionalized 
intrapreneurial practices by creating corporation-supported 
intrapreneurial initiatives. For example, Google, Inc. allots a certain 
amount of time each week (the so-called “20% program”) in which all 
employees are free to think and come up with the proverbial next big 
idea.29 At Lockheed Martin, Inc., members of its “Skunk Work” 
group operate as their own division and are explicitly given free-reign 
to develop innovative ideas;30 however, this is not necessarily an 
intrapreneurial practice (or put differently, Skunk Work team 
members would fall in the “I” in Diagram 2 above, but not necessarily 
in “i”). Meanwhile, some corporations, such as Barclays PLC, 
sponsor internal competitions that invite employees to develop and 
submit intrapreneurial ideas.31 Part of the prize for the winners is 
sponsorship to participate in The Intrapreneur Lab run in 
collaboration with Accenture Development Partnerships and a 
number of business schools globally.32 More broadly speaking, some 
 
27 See Steve Denning, The New Management Paradigm & John Mackey’s Whole 
Foods, FORBES (Jan. 5, 2013, 2:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013 
/01/05/the-new-management-paradigm-john-mackeys-whole-foods/. 
28 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 14. 
29 See Chris Trimble, Google and the Myth of Free Time, HARV. BUS. REV., Aug. 17, 
2010, http://blogs.hbr.org/2010/08/free-time-innovation/; Ashoka, 2015’s Most Valuable 
Organization: A Changemaker Company, FORBES (Sept. 17, 2015, 12:00 AM), 
http://www forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2015/09/17/2015s-most-valuable-organization-the      
-changemaker-company/ (describing “changemaker companies” which attract, engage, and 
retain the top talent with three qualities: (1) implementing strong mandates and executive 
alignment towards creating social value; (2) integrating social impact objectives directly 
into corporate strategy; and (3) implementing structures in such a way as to allow for 
change-making within the organization such as professional development, training 
sessions, engagement in social impact, etc.). 
30 See generally Skunk Works, LOCKHEED MARTIN, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us 
/aeronautics/skunkworks.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
31 David Grayson, Helping Social Intrapreneurship Reach a Tipping Point, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business 
/social-intrapreneurship-tipping-point. 
32 Id. 
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corporations try to encourage a general culture of innovation by 
working in open office spaces and/or adopting a holocracy system.33 
While there is no singular model for social intrapreneurs, one 
common trait of successful intrapreneurs is that they are able to see 
connections between their corporation’s capabilities and outside 
societal needs. Another common trait is their ability to tap into their 
corporation’s business model to create products, services, or internal 
solutions that reshape the corporation’s relationship with society in a 
mutually beneficial way. The Field Guide Report offered the 
following observation: Successful social intrapreneurs understand 
business processes and priorities, and have a sharp nose for 
identifying “suboptimal equilibriums, where markets work well for 
some, but not at all for others.” These intrapreneurs develop 
innovative business models for addressing these suboptimal 
equilibriums and encourage their host organization to look beyond 
their comfort zones to see new opportunities for the business. As 
such, they act as an interface between the employer-organization and 
the world of social enterprise, and understand how to articulate the 
“business case” for their proposed venture.34 
In addition to coordinating resources on a micro level within their 
individual corporations, on a macro level, social intrapreneurs have 
the potential to fundamentally change the business landscape. In this 
regard, the Field Guide Report compared social intrapreneurs to 
beavers, stating that: 
 Intrapreneurs have the potential to profoundly reshape their 
landscapes and to create whole cascades of new opportunity for 
those around them [just like] a beaver. Key elements of success 
include . . . perseverance in implementing small steps to achieve a 
clear intent and vision—but in addition the beaver brings its ability 
to engineer new dams and channels of value and to bend the 
resources of the wider ecosystem to the task at hand, and so 
transform the landscape.35 
 
33 See, e.g., Lana Bortolot, Designing a Better Office Space, ENTREPRENEUR (July 26, 
2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/235375 (discussing general culture of 
innovation and open office spaces); Lisa Wirthman, Is Flat Better? Zappos Ditches 
Hierarchy to Improve Company Performance, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2014, 8:52 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sungardas/2014/01/07/is-flat-better-zappos-ditches-hierarchy 
-to-improve-company-performance/ (discussing Zappos’s move to flat management—or 
“[h]olacracy, a flatter operating structure with no job titles or managers”—and studies that 
show flat companies may actually perform better). 
34 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 5, 13. 
35 Id. at 30. 
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Continuing the beaver analogy, the report noted that beavers are 
known for “building dams in rivers and streams, and then setting up 
homes, or lodges, in the resulting pond.”36 The beaver’s dam building 
usually benefits not only the beaver but the “wider ecosystem” as 
well, whether it be in “incidental benefits [like] flood control,” 
reduced erosion, or the restoration of wetlands.37 
The comparison to beavers is a helpful metaphor for visualizing the 
impact that social intrapreneurs can have on their host corporation 
and, in turn, on their host corporation’s actions vis-à-vis society. The 
balance of Part I considers specific examples that reveal the nature of 
the relationships between intrapreneurs and their host corporation 
and, in turn, between the host corporation and external communities. 
Consider the following case studies: 
Case Study 1: Vodafone & M-PESA. Vodafone is in the 
telecommunications industry and is primarily focused on mobile 
telecommunication.38 As highlighted in the Introduction, two 
employees of Vodafone developed a business model in response to 
Kenya’s access-to-banking problem.39 The model M-PESA was 
based on the insight that as of 2006, 80% of the population had no 
access to the formal banking network,40 even though 54% of the 
population owned mobile phones. M-PESA (“M” stands for mobile 
and “Pesa” is Swahili for money) allows users to move money and 
transfer funds through their phone, thereby creating a more efficient 
and cost-effective way of transacting their financial affairs.41 Of 
course today, mobile banking is much more widespread, but, 
unbeknownst to many, its growth stemmed from a response to a 
societal problem. Not surprisingly, in addition to benefitting Kenyan 
society, Vodafone has also financially benefited, as it has been able to 
forge and secure a wider network of customers.42 As a testament to 
 
36 Id. at 43. 
37 Id. 
38 About Us, VODAFONE, http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/about/about-us.html 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
39 See MAS & RADCLIFFE, supra note 1, at 1–2; SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 7. 
40 FINACCESS, FINACCESS NATIONAL SURVEY 2009: DYNAMICS OF KENYA’S 
CHANGING FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE 11–12 (2009), http://www.fsdkenya.org/finaccess 
/documents/09-06-10_FinAccess_FA09_Report.pdf. 
41 MAS & RADCLIFFE, supra note 1, at 1. 
42 See Twomey, supra note 3. 
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the business success of M-PESA, on March 31, 2014, Vodafone 
announced that it was launching its M-PESA platform in Europe.43 
Case Study 2: Procter & Gamble and PUR. The story of Procter & 
Gamble (P&G) and PUR is illustrative of a different kind of 
intrapreneurship where, instead of developing a new product, 
technology, or business model, the intrapreneur takes an existing 
product, technology, or business model and reconceptualizes its use. 
In 2002, P&G launched PUR, an on-the-spot water decontaminant, 
which was designed to address the problem of access to clean 
water44—a problem that, according to UNICEF, affects 
approximately 768 million people across the globe.45 At first, P&G 
attempted to market PUR commercially, but found that it lacked the 
capacity to reach remote rural areas in parts of the developing world 
that could benefit the most.46 A P&G employee, Dr. Philip Souter, 
noted that one significant roadblock was in convincing skeptical 
villagers that the cause of many of their health problems was related 
to the contaminated water they had been consuming.47 Another P&G 
employee, Dr. Greg Allgood, reconceptualized PUR from a direct 
commercial selling model and persuaded P&G to convert PUR into a 
nonprofit venture called the “P&G Children’s Safe Drinking Water 
program.”48 Under this new nonprofit model, PUR would be provided 
at cost to humanitarian organizations, and, additionally, P&G would 
donate extra funding to provide education about its use and benefits.49 
The P&G PUR initiative is an example of the types of activities that 
would fall into the grey, shaded area in Diagram 3, above. Dr. 
Allgood had the intrapreneurial insight to reconceptualize an existing 
business model, but the model that resulted had social need as part of 
its core mandate, thus making it more like a CSR or philanthropic 
program. P&G later sold its PUR Water Filter division to Helen of 
 
43 Press Release, Vodafone, Vodafone M-Pesa Comes to Europe for the First Time 
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/media/vodafone-group-releases 
/2014/m-pesa-romania.html. 
44 Sarah Ellison & Eric Bellman, Clean Water, No Profit, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2005, 
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110910057933261072. 
45 Stephanie Adickman, How Your Dollars Turn Into Clean Water, UNICEF U.S. FUND 
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.unicefusa.org/stories/mission/survival/water/tap-project/how 
-your-dollars-turn-clean-water/7570. 
46 James Addis, PUR Genius, WORLD VISION BLOG (July 6, 2011), http://blog.world 
vision.org/causes/pur-genius. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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Troy Ltd. in December 2011 for an undisclosed amount, and the 
division was expected to exceed $110 million in sales by the time the 
transaction was complete.50 
Case Study 3: Hindustan Unilever. Unilever is a large 
conglomerate that produces several well-known brands like Dove 
soap, Lipton tea, and Bertolli olive oil.51 While Unilever’s products 
are available throughout India, the company recognized that there 
were several rural villages in India that had no access to its 
products.52 An insider at Unilever recognized that many of these rural 
villages had high rates of unemployment and the segment of the 
population that was most likely to be unemployed was women.53 
From this insight, the Unilever insider was able to create a bridge 
between the societal problem of rural unemployment that 
disproportionately affects women, and the corporation’s interest in 
successfully reaching what were thought to be inaccessible rural 
markets.54 The idea was Project Shakti, an initiative that employs 
women in rural villages to distribute Unilever’s products.55 Shakti 
currently employs approximately seventy thousand entrepreneurs 
(“Shakti Ammas”), who in turn distribute to approximately four 
million households, and because of Shakti are now able to provide 
some of the more basic needs for their families like food, education, 
and a modest home.56 The scale and impact of Shakti grew 
dramatically, and Unilever anticipated in 2010 that it would recruit, 
train, and employ an additional forty-eight thousand Shakti Ammas 
 
50 Helen of Troy Buys PUR Water Filters from P&G, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2011, 10:17 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marketnewsvideo/2011/12/06/helen-of-troy-buys-pur    
-water-filters-from-pg/. However, the sale did not include P&G’s Children’s Safe Drinking 
Water philanthropy program that utilized the water filters to provide clean water to 
children in underdeveloped countries. See Helen of Troy Buying PUR Business from P&G, 
USA TODAY MONEY (Dec. 6, 2011, 11:01 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com 
/money/industries/story/2011-12-06/Helen-of-Troy-acquisition/51671312/1; About Us, 
P&G CHILDREN’S SAFE DRINKING WATER PROGRAM, https://www.csdw.org/csdw/about 
-childrens-safe-drinking-water.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
51 Our Brands, UNILEVER, http://www.unilever.com/brands-in-action/view-brands.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
52 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 40. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 Enhancing Livelihoods Through Project Shakti, HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LIMITED, 
http://www.hul.co.in/sustainable-living-2015/casestudies/Project-Shakti.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2015). 
56 See id. 
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by 2015.57 While reaching the rural population was perhaps directly 
driven by a profit-making ethos, the way in which the company 
decided to reach this rural population advanced not just corporate but 
social interests. 
Case Study 4: Danone Bangladesh. Danone is a leader in the food 
industry and is probably best known for its yogurts.58 Bangladesh has 
a high rate of malnutrition, with approximately 30% of all 
Bangladeshis and 56% of all Bangladeshi children under the age of 
five suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition.59 In 2006, 
Danone developed an enriched yogurt with essential nutrients 
(Grameen Danone) that could be delivered at a price point well below 
Danone’s traditional model.60 Grameen Danone is run as a joint 
venture between Danone and the Bangladeshi government.61 Since 
developing the product, Danone has decided not to focus on Grameen 
Danone as a profit-making venture.62 Instead, Danone has taken the 
know-how it developed in creating the enriched yogurt product for the 
Bangladeshi market and applied it to a new line of yogurt products, 
Activia, which it now markets in the United States and other 
markets.63 Danone executives have repeatedly noted that, but for their 
focus on developing a yogurt that helped solve Bangladesh’s 
malnutrition crisis, they probably would never have developed the 
know-how that then allowed them to develop Activia. Activia has 
allowed Danone to broaden their yogurt offerings and market 
potential.64 
 
57 Id.; HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LIMITED, ANNUAL REPORT 2012–13: MAKING 
SUSTAINABLE LIVING COMMONPLACE 14 (2013), http://www.hul.co.in/Images/HUL 
_Annual_Report_2012-13_tcm114-289694.pdf; UNILEVER, PROGRESS REPORT 2012: 
UNILEVER SUSTAINABLE LIVING PLAN 7 (2013), http://www.unilever.co.uk/Images 
/USLP-Progress-Report-2012-FI_tcm28-352007.pdf. 
58 See Danone at a Glance, DANONE, http://www.danone.com/en/for-all/mission           
-strategy/danone-at-a-glance/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
59 Grameen Danone Foods Ltd., GRAMEEN CREATIVE LAB, http://www.grameen 
creativelab.com/live-examples/grameen-danone-foods-ltd.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2015); 
see also U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., FAO—NUTRITION COUNTRY PROFILES: 
BANGLADESH 3–4 (1999), ftp://ftp.fao.org/es/esn/nutrition/ncp/BGDmap.pdf. 
60 Grameen Danone Foods Ltd., supra note 59. 
61 Grameen Danone Foods Ltd: The Project’s History, DANONE COMMUNITIES, 
http://www.danonecommunities.com/en/project/grameen-danone-food?mode=history (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
62 Id. 
63 See DANNON ACTIVIA, http://activia.us.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2015); Barbara 
Kiviat, Danone’s Cheap Trick, TIME (Aug. 23, 2010), http://content.time.com/time 
/magazine/article/0,9171,2010077,00.html. 
64 See Kiviat, supra note 63. 
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In addition to these examples, there are several other stories of 
intrapreneurial behavior occurring at different corporations in a 
variety of industries.65 While the collected stories of intrapreneurial 
activity are too extensive to be individually described in detail, the 
Appendix provides a snapshot of the extent and multi-dimensionality 
of social-intrapreneurial endeavors. 
The examples set forth in Appendix demonstrate the breadth of 
behavior associated with the social intrapreneur. Although social-
intrapreneurial practices are diverse both in terms of the industry of 
the host corporations and the intrapreneurial products, services, or 
solutions they devise, six key commonalities emerge. First, social 
intrapreneurship is in large part a voluntary undertaking that requires 
either the implicit or explicit agreement on the part of the host 
corporation in order for it to be successful.66 Second, social 
intrapreneurship is a private ordering intra-corporate activity that 
takes place in the absence of regulation or other legal directive. Third, 
social intrapreneurs are adept at seeing the relationship between the 
corporation’s potential and the extra-corporation needs of society.67 
Fourth, and related to the third, social intrapreneurs are able to “code 
switch.”68 In other words, they are able to move between a business 
mindset and a focus on societal needs, part of which includes being 
able to make the “business case” for a social product or service that 
may not obviously contribute to the financial bottom line.69 Fifth, 
social intrapreneurs are adept at seeing new ways of redeploying and 
coordinating corporate resources to achieve tripartite 
dimensionality—social, moral, and financial.70 And sixth, social 
intrapreneurs do not seem to view profit as their sole maximand. 
Rather, their strength is in creating new opportunities that inure to the 
benefit of both the corporation and society, and being able to 
articulate the business case for their initiatives.71 Put differently, 
considerations of profit are a necessary part of the analysis for many 
intrapreneurial initiatives, yet such considerations are not looked at in 
isolation or as a maximand; rather, they are viewed in tandem with 
the social need that the initiative seeks to address. For example, in a 
 
65 See infra Appendix. 
66 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 5. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 30. 
69 See id. 
70 See Ashoka, supra note 6; SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 27, 30. 
71 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 13. 
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recent interview, Aspen First Movers Fellow and Director of 
Corporate Strategy Development at Dow Chemical, Dawn Baker, 
stated that to justify social intrapreneurship to shareholders, it is 
important to start with the company’s vision and show how an 
innovative project will fulfill that vision.72 In other words, 
corporations should present intrapreneurial innovations to 
shareholders not solely in terms of profit, but also by demonstrating 
how these innovations will benefit the corporation’s corporate 
purpose and/or goals. 
In spite of its touted value, however, social intrapreneurship 
presents concerns that should give one pause. First, one should 
consider the all that glitters is not gold problem—meaning that, as 
described above, there are certain activities that outwardly manifest as 
social-intrapreneurial-like but inwardly are really driven by profit, 
thus falling into the category of activities dismissively labeled as 
green washing. This concern will arise any time an initiative presents 
a strong business case. Second, is the concern that because some 
intrapreneurs work on their initiatives off the clock, there is an 
increased risk of inefficient resource use or, in the extreme, 
misappropriation of the corporation’s resources by the employee-
intrapreneur. Third, are concerns related to the increased 
identification and monitoring costs that are incurred by the 
corporation when managing intrapreneurial initiatives. 
Many of the social intrapreneurs interviewed for the Field Guide 
Report acknowledged the opposing arguments against 
intrapreneurship. Common reported responses from opponents 
included, “[w]e’re not in that business,” “[w]e’ll be seen to be 
greenwashing,” and “[t]his is a distraction.”73 Part V returns to these 
concerns and considers potential contractual, doctrinal, and 
organizational solutions that help alleviate these concerns. 
Nonetheless, in spite of the various concerns about social 
intrapreneurship, The Economist, in an article reviewing a book on 
social intrapreneurs, posited that intrapreneurs rather than 
entrepreneurs were arguably the greatest change agents for 
developing innovative and sustainable products, services, and 
 
72 Aspen at Roosevelt House–Social Intrapreneurship: Keeping Your Day Job and 
Finding Meaning in Your Work, ROOSEVELT HOUSE (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www 
.roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/events/aspen-roosevelt-house-social-intrapraneurship/. 
73 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 43. 
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solutions for the market place.74 In a separate article, The Economist 
noted: 
The greatest agents for sustainable change are unlikely to be [social 
entrepreneurs], interesting though they are. They are much more 
likely to be the entirely reasonable people, often working for large 
companies, who see ways to create better products or reach new 
markets, and have the resources to do so.75 
Additionally, Sir Richard Branson, author and founder of Virgin 
Group, summed up the value of intrapreneurs as follows: 
Many millions of people proudly claim the title “entrepreneur.” On 
the other hand, a title that hasn’t gotten nearly the amount of 
attention it deserves is entrepreneur’s little brother, “intrapreneur”   
. . . . While it’s true that every company needs an entrepreneur to 
get it under way, healthy growth requires a smattering of 
intrapreneurs who drive new projects and explore new and 
unexpected directions for business development.76 
In sum, while social intrapreneurship presents some legal 
concerns,77 their value is in their ability to reimagine the bounds and 
limits of their host corporation’s activities. This reimagination, which 
successfully links directives of profit with other-regarding behavior, 
arguably offers an innovative way for a corporation to negotiate 
corporate law’s structural socio-profit divide. 
II 
THE SOCIO-PROFIT DIVIDE: UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR GAP-
FILLING 
In 2014, the United States Supreme Court, in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., stated that “[a] corporation is simply a form of 
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”78 Those 
“desired ends” need not be homogeneous and in practice may differ 
from one corporation to the next. As one might expect, the scope and 
nature of these desired ends—or as one might say “purpose” or 
“mission”—may very well be determined by a range of factors. These 
factors include the corporation’s business model, the will of its 
 
74 Unreasonable People Power, ECONOMIST (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.economist 
.com/node/%2010555875. 
75 Social Entrepreneurs: Agents of Change, supra note 7. 
76 Richard Branson, Richard Branson on Intrapreneurs, ENTREPRENEURS (Jan. 31, 
2011), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/218011. 
77 See infra Part IV. 
78 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
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shareholders, law, industry norms and best practices, management’s 
internal moral compass, historical events, and external societal 
pressures. 
However, despite the positive fact that, in practice, corporations 
seem to take a “let a thousand flowers bloom” approach to their 
articulated purpose, as a normative matter, the question of what 
should be the proper purpose of corporations continues to engage the 
corporate law academy. There are two primary approaches to the 
purpose of a corporation: one, to maximize shareholder wealth—
called the “property view” or “shareholder primacy view”—and the 
other, as having a “broader social purpose that [goes] beyond making 
money for their shareholders.”79 Another category that should be 
inserted into this debate, but traditionally has not been, are those who 
believe there does not have to be a choice, that successful 
corporations can do both. 
This Article does not seek to resolve the debate. Rather, the 
remainder of Part II attempts to trace the contours of the debate and to 
succinctly summarize key factors that have contributed to the 
trajectory and shape of the debate, with an eye on understanding the 
main points of contention. 
A. The Origins 
While one could certainly have a mini-debate about where to begin 
an attempt to describe the history of corporations and, relatedly, 
discussions about their purpose, this Article takes the seventeenth 
century as its starting point, primarily because it was a period that saw 
the growth in the corporate form.80 In the 1600s, as countries like 
England, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain tried to expand the 
reach of their empires and establish trade with the new world, 
corporate forms were established and granted powers by the state to 
execute these trading missions.81 These initial corporations were 
viewed as “bodies politic” that existed “on sufferance of the Crown,” 
which in turn had reserved the right to revoke or revise the 
corporation’s issued charter and which required regular charter 
renewal.82 As noted jurist and thinker, Sir William Blackstone, 
 
79 LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 16 (2012). 
80 See David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the 
Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 139 (2013). In the seventeenth century, the 
corporations were often referred to as “body corporates.” Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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observed at the time, corporations were essentially “little 
republic[s].”83 
Prior to the nineteenth century, corporations were viewed as quasi-
public entities that owed their existence and rights to the chartering 
state.84 However, at some point in the nineteenth century, and 
continuing on into the early 1900s, corporations began to be 
conceptualized through a distinctly private-purpose lens.85 One 
explanation for this change relates to the triumph of liberalism over 
mercantilism in broader political thought, which resulted in 
corporations being viewed as private concerns drawn up through 
private contract.86 David Ciepley, a political science professor whose 
work focuses on the history of corporations, summarized the 
connection as such: 
One of the signal projects of nineteenth-century American 
liberalism was to sharpen the distinction between public and private 
and divide the social world between them. Business corporations 
were placed on the private side of this divide, assimilated to 
liberalism as private partnerships and, in some contexts, even as 
private persons. Corporate power that was once unaccountable 
because of state regulatory weakness now became unaccountable as 
a point of legal doctrine, as corporations came to be viewed ever 
more thoroughly through the lens of private contract.87 
In the 1930s, the Harvard Law Review published a highly charged 
dispute between Professors Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd. Professor 
Berle adopted the shareholder primacy view, arguing that “all powers 
granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation . . . 
[are] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the 
 
83 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *468 (“But when they are then 
consolidated and united into a corporation, they and their successors are then considered as 
one person in law: as one person, they have one will, which is collected from the sense of 
the majority of the individuals: this one will may establish rules and orders for the 
regulation of the whole, which are a sort of municipal laws of this little republic; or rules 
and statutes may be prescribed to it at its creation, which are then in the place of natural 
laws . . . .”); see also Ciepley, supra note 80, at 141. 
84 David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 205–06 (1990). 
85 See Allen, supra note 14, at 266 & n.13. 
86 See id. at 280. 
87 Ciepley, supra note 80, at 139 (citations omitted). As an aside, Ciepley’s point that 
corporations “came to be viewed ever more thoroughly through the lens of private 
contract” can be seen in the nexus of contract theoretical strand in the corporate law 
literature. Nexus of contract  theorists view the corporation as an interconnected web of 
contracts that reflect privately negotiated terms and where the regulatory role of the state 
should be kept to a minimum. See infra Part V.B. for a general discussion of the web of 
contract theory and, specifically, its application to social intrapreneurship. 
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shareholders . . . .”88 Professor Dodd staunchly disagreed.89 He 
argued that “the business corporation [is] an economic institution 
which has a social service as well as a profit-making function . . . .”90 
Thus, as Professor Stout writes, for Dodd, “the proper purpose of a 
public company went beyond making money for shareholders and 
included providing secure jobs for employees, quality products for 
consumers, and contributions to the broader society.”91 Dodd’s view 
of the public corporation as an entity chartered by the state “for public 
benefit and run by professional managers seeking to serve not only 
shareholders but also ‘stakeholders’,” held considerable sway in the 
first half of the twentieth century. Ironically, in 1954 Berle conceded 
the debate, stating that: “[t]he argument has been settled (at least for 
the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.”92 
However, starting in the 1970s, shareholder primacy thinking 
began to regain its footing, with economists arguing that the proper 
purpose of corporate governance was to maximize shareholder 
wealth. An oft-cited example, which was influential in establishing 
shareholder primacy as a dominant paradigm, was an article by 
Nobel-prize winning economist Milton Friedman, in which he argued 
that given that shareholders “own” the corporation, increasing profits 
should be the only responsibility of business.93 
This idea of shareholders as owners is the core of a seminal piece 
by Michael Jensen, where he described the shareholders as the 
principals of the corporation and the board of directors as their 
agents.94 Thus, he argued, the only legitimate purpose of the 
corporation was to maximize shareholder wealth.95 
 
88 A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 
(1931). In 1932, Professor Berle also articulated these views in a book he had coauthored 
with Gardiner Means. See generally ADOLF A. BERNE & GARDINAR MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
89 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1932). 
90 Id. at 1148. 
91 STOUT, supra note 79, at 17. 
92 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954). 
93 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33. 
94 See generally MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, 
RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS (2003). 
95 Id. 
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B. Shareholder Primacy 
Shareholder primacy has a built-in package of rules, principles, and 
terminology that makes it efficient and attractive to academia, the 
popular press, and business media alike. The notion of having an 
objective maximand (i.e., maximize shareholder wealth) with an 
objective means of measurement (the stock market and the attendant 
efficient market hypothesis) and a tightly worded framing of the 
problem, proved and continues to prove attractive to many.96 The 
shareholder primacy view and its attendant solutions, such as 
increased shareholder rights and enhanced control and monitoring of 
boards, pervade and shape the corporate law landscape. For example, 
the shareholder primacy view is embedded in corporate law 
curriculum and is often presented to law students as the default 
framework for thinking about corporate governance and corporate 
purpose. Shareholder primacy thinking has also influenced significant 
changes and developments in corporate law, such as changes to the 
shareholder proxy voting rules in 1992 that made it easier for 
shareholders to embattle incumbent boards.97 In addition, the 
shareholder primacy view is reflected in the tax code, most apparent 
in the 1993 amendments to the U.S. tax code that sought to encourage 
companies to tie executive pay to stock price and other objective 
performance metrics.98 It can also be found in the case law, most 
notably in the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., where the court 
stated that “a business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”99 
Strands of shareholder primacy thinking are also reflected in the 
Cadbury Report (which notes that boards are accountable to 
shareholders because the board acts as stewards on behalf of the 
shareholders),100 which in turn formed the basis for the OECD 
 
96 See Tamara C. Belinfanti, Forget Roger Rabbit—Is Corporate Purpose Being 
Framed?, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (2013–14) (discussing the implications of framing 
theory on the corporate purpose debate). 
97 See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a (2015). 
98 See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m); Jay Lorsch, The Pay Problem, HARV. MAG., May–June 
2010, http://harvardmagazine.com/2010/05/the-pay-problem. 
99 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
100 See COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ¶ 6.6 (1992), 
http://www.icaew.com/~/media/corporate/files/library/subjects/corporate%20governance 
/financial%20aspects%20of%20corporate%20governance.ashx. 
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Principles of Corporate Governance.101 However, the OECD 
Principles do not adopt a strong shareholder primacy view in that they 
recognize that one of the goals of corporate governance should be to 
design systems that encourage boards and managers to make 
decisions that benefit the long-term interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders.102 
Finally, the shareholder primacy framework abounds in legal 
literature. As Professor Jeffrey Gordon observed, “[b]y the end of the 
1990s, the triumph of the shareholder value criterion was nearly 
complete.”103 However, perhaps no clearer indication of shareholder 
primacy’s “triumph” exists than an article entitled The End of History 
for Corporate Law, wherein Professors Kraakman and Hansmann 
asserted that “the triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the 
corporation over its principal competitors is now assured . . . .”104 
Professors Kraakman and Hansmann declared that: 
[A]cademic, business, and governmental elites in leading 
jurisdictions [all agreed] . . . that ultimate control over the 
corporation should rest with the shareholder class; the managers of 
the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the 
corporation in the interests of its shareholders; other corporate 
constituencies, such as creditors, employees, suppliers, and 
customers, should have their interests protected by contractual and 
regulatory means rather than through participation in corporate 
governance . . . .105 
C. The Longstanding Counterpoint and Recent Shift 
Not to beat the proverbial dead horse, but despite the asserted 
triumph of shareholder primacy, there is a long-standing unease in the 
corporate law literature with how to square profit maxims with 
notions of social value creation. As others have noted, one view is 
that corporate law does not require that corporations relentlessly 
maximize shareholder value, except in the limited instance when the 
corporation has entered “Revlon mode,” which occurs when the 
 
101 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernance 
principles/31557724.pdf. 
102 Id. at 60. 
103 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1530 
(2007). 
104 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001). 
105 Id. at 440–41. 
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corporation is for sale.106 Four sources of corporate law are helpful 
for explicating this point: state corporate and constituency statutes; 
the use of organic documents; the business judgment rule (BJR); and 
state case law. Thus, for starters, state corporate statutes do not 
require a specific purpose of profit maximization. The Delaware 
General Corporate Law (DGCL), for example, provides that “[a] 
corporation may be incorporated or organized under this chapter to 
conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes . . . .”107 
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Business Corporations Act provides that 
“every business corporation has as its corporate purpose the engaging 
in lawful business for which corporations may be incorporated under 
the BCL.”108 In fact, a majority of states have constituency statutes 
that explicitly allow the corporation to consider stakeholders other 
than shareholders.109 
Second, it is interesting to note that if a corporation chooses to 
define its purpose as being to maximize shareholder wealth, it could 
do so by indicating as such in its organic documents. However, 
according to Professor Lynn Stout, “[t]he typical corporate charter 
defines the corporate purpose as anything ‘lawful.’”110 Third, the BJR 
leaves the board with discretion to determine the best course of action 
for the company so long as they are acting in good faith in the best 
interest of the company.111 Fourth, similar to the OECD Principles, 
case law generally describes directors’ duties as being owed to both 
the corporation and the shareholders.112 Moreover, several of the 
takeover cases provide an interesting counterpoint to the shareholder 
primacy paradigm. In the case of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co., the Supreme Court of Delaware stated that in considering the 
merits of a business transaction, the directors could consider the 
 
106 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986) (holding that when the sale of a corporation becomes inevitable, the board of 
directors’ duties changes from preserving the corporate entity to maximizing the 
company’s value in the sale for the shareholders’ benefits). 
107 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2014). 
108 19 PA. CODE § 23.4(b) (2013). 
109 Jessica Chu, Filling a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 172 (2013) (“For the   
. . . states that have not adopted constituency statutes, state corporate laws neither 
expressly permit directors to consider the interests of stakeholders nor explicitly require 
directors to consider only corporations and shareholders.”). 
110 Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
163, 169 (2008). 
111 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
112 Id. 
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“impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders . . . .”113 The 
court even went so far as to enumerate in parenthetical whom they 
had in mind, stating “(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and 
perhaps even the community generally).”114 
Leading corporate law scholars such as Professor Einer Elhauge 
and Professor Lynn Stout, have questioned the validity and utility of 
shareholder primacy when applied to the large public corporation.115 
Far from conceding the “triumph” of shareholder primacy over the 
social institution view, in a 1992 Cardozo Law Review article, former 
Chancellor Allen described the duality and bifurcation between 
axioms of profit and those of social interest that pervade corporate 
law and practice.116 The former Chancellor wrote: 
Two inconsistent conceptions have dominated our thinking about 
corporations since the evolution of the large integrated business 
corporation in the late nineteenth century. . . . In the first 
conception, the corporation is seen as the private property of its 
stockholder-owners [and] [t]he corporation’s purpose is to advance 
the purposes of these owners (predominantly to increase their 
wealth). . . . The second conception sees the corporation not as the 
private property of stockholders, but as a social institution. 
According to this view, the corporation is not strictly private; it is 
tinged with a public purpose.117 
Similarly, in a 2005 article published in the New York University 
Law Review, Professor Elhauge discussed the conceptual divide that 
has traditionally existed in the canonical corporate law account 
between concepts of profit and those of social good.118 Elhauge noted 
that the canonical account views social and moral considerations as 
best dealt with outside of corporate law, and thus, according to the 
canonical account, corporate law should focus on aligning the 
interests of managers and shareholders to maximize shareholder 
profit.119 
 
113 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
114 Id. 
115 See generally Allen, supra note 14; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in 
the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad 
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Change of Control 
Transactions: Is There Any “There” There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2002). 
116 See generally Allen, supra note 14. 
117 Id. at 264–65. 
118 Elhauge, supra note 115, at 776–818. 
119 See id. 
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The most recent installment in the debate can be found in a 
forthcoming essay by Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo E. 
Strine, Jr. In his forthcoming essay, the Chief Justice reaffirms the 
existing structural divide between profit and social axioms and argues 
that “directors must make stockholder welfare their sole end, and that 
other interests may be taken into consideration only as a means of 
promoting stockholder welfare.”120 In sum, the gap between profit 
and social axioms remains a fundamental feature of American 
corporate law. Yet today many for-profit corporations face pressure 
from various stakeholders including investors, consumers, and 
prospective employees to bridge this structural gap created by 
corporate law. 
D. Bridging the Gap 
But how can one bridge this noted divide? In a post-2008 world, 
the solutions on the table have been both internal and external. In 
terms of the former, large pockets of attention have been dedicated to 
CSR and sustainability initiatives on the part of large corporations, 
and other internal programs that have a social aspect. These include 
impact investing, community relations, corporate philanthropy, or 
working towards innovative models (like Whole Foods CEO John 
Mackey’s “conscious capitalism” or Harvard Business School 
professor Michael Porter’s “creating shared value”).121 Part I 
provided an overview of these internal CSR solutions and programs. 
The balance of Part II.D considers external solutions that focus on 
creating alternative business forms. 
First, is the low-profit limited liability company (or L3C). 
Generally, L3Cs are modified LLCs that make it simpler for a 
company with a social purpose to gain investments by way of loans, 
grants, and charitable foundations.122 State L3C legislation generally 
alters an existing LLC statute and allows the L3C to receive Program 
 
120 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Danger of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding 
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 10) 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576389). 
121 See generally MACKEY & SISODIA, supra note 10; Porter & Kramer, supra note 10. 
122 Malika Zouhali-Worrall, For L3C Companies, Profit Isn’t the Point, CNN: MONEY 
(Feb. 9, 2010, 10:49 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/08/smallbusiness/l3c_low 
_profit_companies/. 
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Related Investments (PRIs) from private foundations.123 An L3C’s 
articles of incorporation must typically state the entity’s primary 
charitable or educational purpose, or that the entity does not have a 
significant purpose to produce income or appreciate property.124 The 
L3C’s benefits include the legal and tax flexibility of traditional 
LLCs, the “social good” approach of nonprofits, and the public 
relations benefits of a social enterprise.125 However, their success 
largely depends on the effectiveness of proposed IRS regulations to 
reduce the tax risks associated with PRIs.126 The future of the L3C, 
“the most widely criticized social enterprise entity,”127 may even be 
in jeopardy. In January 2014, North Carolina abolished its L3C 
legislation, finding that “[they are] not necessary” and that the 
traditional LLC could be used for most of its purposes.128 
Less controversial than the L3C are the flexible purpose 
corporations (FPCs) and social purpose corporations (SPCs). 
California established the first FPC state statute in 2011; however, the 
California legislature amended its FPC statute and renamed such 
entities “Social Purpose Corporations.”129 As in California, 
Washington and Texas have statutes for the organization of SPCs.130 
 
123 Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer 
on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the 
Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 682 (2013). 
124 Id. at 683. 
125 Marc J. Lane, Social Enterprises: A New Business Form Driving Social Change, 16 
ABA YOUNG LAWYER, Dec. 2011, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/young 
_lawyer/2011-12/december_2011/social_enterprises_new_business_form_driving_social 
_change.html. 
126 Esposito, supra note 123, at 706. 
127 Id. at 688. 
128 Anne Field, North Carolina Officially Abolishes the L3C, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2014, 
11:17 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2014/01/11/north-carolina-officially     
-abolishes-the-l3c/. 
129 Steven R. Chiodini, Goodbye Flexible Purpose Corporation, Hello Social Purpose 
Corporation, LAWFORCHANGE, http://www.lawforchange.org/NewsBot.asp?MODE 
=VIEW&ID=6384 (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). Effective January 1, 2015, previously 
organized FPCs in California became SPCs, but they need not amend their article of 
incorporation. Id. 
130 Corp. Laws Comm., ABA Bus. Law Section, Benefit Corporation White Paper, 68 
BUS. LAW. 1083, 1088–89 (Aug. 2013). Under the Washington statute, “the articles of 
incorporation of a social purpose corporation may, but need not, contain a provision 
‘requiring the corporation’s directors or officers to consider the impacts of any corporate 
action or proposed corporate action upon one or more of the social purposes of the 
corporation.’” Id. In Texas, its legislature amended its Business Organizations Code 
allowing “for-profit corporations to include one or more social purposes in their 
certificates of formation, and it set forth a list of acceptable social purposes identical to the 
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Like FPCs, an SPC’s articles of incorporation must provide a 
corporate purpose statement and must be organized to promote or 
minimize short-term or long-term effects of the corporation’s 
activities upon: (1) its employees, suppliers, or customers; (2) the 
local, state, national, or world community; and/or (3) the 
environment.131 Unlike the FPC statute, “charitable purposes” is 
absent.132 Additionally, under the California and Washington statutes, 
directors may but are not required to consider its enumerated purpose 
as a factor in making decisions, although the Washington statute 
allows SPCs to include a provision that requires directors to consider 
such impacts.133 As with FPCs, directors of SPCs enjoy limited 
liability and are shielded from actions for failure to maximize 
shareholder value.134 This “distinctly anti-Revlon, anti-shareholder 
wealth maximization mission” makes SPCs an appealing 
alternative.135 However, SPCs and FPCs share similar drawbacks: the 
lack of a third-party standard in reporting promotes a lack of 
accountability and forces investors to rely on unregulated 
assessments.136 
A final alternative business form is the benefit corporation.137 At 
the time this Article was submitted for publication, thirty-one states 
have passed legislation on benefit corporations.138 B Lab, the 
 
‘specific public benefit’ list offered by B Lab as a model for benefit corporation states.” Id. 
at 1089. 
131 Esposito, supra note 123, at 692–93. 
132 Id. at 693. 
133 Benefit Corporation White Paper, supra note 130, at 1088–89. 
134 Esposito, supra note 123, at 693–94. 
135 Id. at 694 (italicization added). 
136 Id. 
137 Note the distinction between a “B Corporation” and a benefit corporation: B Lab 
certifies existing corporations that wish to brand themselves as “B Corporations,” while 
benefit corporations are corporate entities authorized under state corporate law. Id. at 695. 
To become a B Lab-certified “B Corporation,” B Lab requires that the corporation conduct 
an impact assessment, submit required documents, adopt B Lab’s amendments to its 
articles of incorporation, complete a disclosure questionnaire, pay a certification fee, and 
agree to randomized on-site reviews. See Performance Requirements, BENEFIT CORP., 
http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/performance         
-requirements (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). 
138 State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/policy 
makers/state-by-state-status (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). Not all legislation is uniform; for 
instance, Hawaii’s benefit corporations are known as “sustainable business corporations” 
and Maryland’s legislation includes both benefit corporations and benefit limited liability 
companies (or BLLCs). See CARTER G. BISHOP, SUFFOLK UNIV. LAW SCH., LEGAL 
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 10–11, FIFTY STATE SERIES: L3C & B CORPORATION 
LEGISLATION TABLE (2014). 
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organization that pioneered the benefit corporation,139 reports that 
over 1,400 registered benefit corporations exist.140 Overall, benefit 
corporation statute sections include general provisions, corporate 
purpose, accountability, and transparency.141 Every statute requires 
the corporation’s articles of incorporation to state that it has the 
purpose of creating a general public benefit and allows them to 
specify one or more special public benefits.142 For accountability, in 
addition to the traditional shareholder-profit duty, benefit corporation 
directors have a duty to consider the effects of business decisions on 
stakeholder groups or constituencies.143 A unique part of benefit-
corporation legislation is the third-party standard requirement, 
ensuring proper transparency of its performance assessment.144 
Many praise the benefit corporation form for providing an 
organizational form that allows companies to “do good” while still 
making a profit.145 In addition, others have noted the appeal that 
benefit corporations have to Millennials, who comprise nearly 50% of 
the global workforce, demand a “work-life integration,” and want to 
bring their “whole selves” to work.146 Delaware Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Strine praised benefit corporations for putting “some actual 
power behind the idea that” a corporation can operate for the best 
interest of both its stockholders and its constituencies.147 However, 
the benefit corporation is not without criticism. For many, they 
present questions:148 Will companies “doing good” also generate 
long-term returns? How will the public markets price them when they 
first go public? Can they honor their commitment if sold to larger 
 
139 Esposito, supra note 123, at 695. 
140 Find a Benefit Corp, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a           
-benefit-corp (last visited Oct. 18, 2015) (B Lab’s search results also indicate whether the 
company is a certified “B Corporation” by B Lab). 
141 Esposito, supra note 123, at 697. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 699. 
144 Id. at 700–01. 
145 Gilbert et al., supra note 12. According to B Lab’s co-founders, benefit corporations 
benefit (1) policy makers and the public interest by combatting “short termism”; (2) 
business leaders by attracting the best talent; (3) customers by providing greater 
transparency; (4) employees by promising higher-quality jobs; and (5) investors by 
mitigating risks and accelerating the growth of market opportunities that meet the needs of 
investors who want to “do good” while still making a profit. 
146 Id. 
147 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making it Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 242 (2014). 
148 See id. at 251–53. 
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companies? Additionally, the greater reporting requirements may 
deter many businesses due to the high transaction costs and the 
ambiguity of the third-party standard assessment.149 The final, but 
arguably most powerful, critique of the benefit corporation150 is the 
harmful “good” versus “bad” dichotomy they create.151 Specifically, 
the promotion of the benefit corporation fosters the erroneous 
understanding that the law compels traditional for-profit corporations 
to single-mindedly maximize profits and only under alternative 
business forms can it consider a range of interests to make responsible 
business decisions.152 
While these various models that seek to provide a business form 
for meshing profit and social interest have gained popularity both at 
the legislative level and in practice, a closer look at these models 
reveals their limits. Namely, these models involve potentially high 
transaction costs. These transaction costs include information 
gathering costs; the cost of initial set-up; ongoing compliance with 
extra layers of formalities (such as any attendant certification 
process); and the uncertainty that attends a wholesale opt-out of a 
known structure (in this case, the traditional for-profit corporation) 
and a wholesale opt-in to a relatively new and untested legal structure. 
In sum, initiatives for bridging the socio-profit gap fall roughly into 
four different camps. The first is internal corporate programs like 
CSR, sustainability initiatives, or corporate philanthropy 
endeavors.153 The second camp includes those proposals that seek to 
shift the focus of inquiry from encouraging the corporation to behave 
“responsibly” to encouraging shareholders—namely institutional 
investors—to behave more responsibly. The third is the creation of 
alternative statutory business forms, such as benefit corporations, 
L3Cs, flexible purpose corporations, and social purpose corporations, 
which explicitly allow corporations to pursue both profit and social 
 
149 See Doug Bend & Alex King, Why Consider a Benefit Corporation?, FORBES (May 
30, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/05/30/why-consider-a         
-benefit-corporation/. 
150 This critique is arguably applicable to all of the above mentioned alternative 
business forms. 
151 Mark A. Underberg, Benefit Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful 
Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corpora 
tions-a-harmful-dichotomy/. 
152 Id. 
153 See supra Part I. 
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interest. And the final camp includes the use of externality regulations 
such as environmental laws or human rights laws. 
Thus far, social intrapreneurship has been noticeably absent from 
legal academic discourse on matters related to socio-profit divisions. 
Yet social intrapreneurship offers a compelling model to corporations 
interested in integrating their social potential with their profit 
objectives.  As Luis Sota, an intrapreneur at CEMEX, noted: “Social 
intrapreneurs create the prophecies that allow companies to make new 
business offerings. At the same time, they are reenvisioning the terms 
in which corporations engage society.”154 
III 
SOCIAL INTRAPRENEURSHIP AS A BRIDGE? 
Luis Sota’s idea of “reenvisioning” and actually recreating “the 
terms [on] which corporations engage society” provides both a 
figurative and conceptual segue to understanding the importance of 
intrapreneurship as a gap-filling device.155 The need for gap-filling 
exists because, in the corporate landscape, there has been a long-
standing divide between notions of being for-profit and being socially 
beneficial.156 Based on the range of social intrapreneurial initiatives 
analyzed for this Article, social intrapreneurship can be 
conceptualized as bridging three related but distinct sets of gaps. 
First, is the “stockholder-to-stakeholder” bridge that results from 
intrapreneurial endeavors that create a connection between 
shareholder maximand concepts and the interests of other 
stakeholders who are involved with and/or affected by the 
corporation’s activity. Second, is a “shareholder-to-shareholder” 
bridge that gets created between so-called impact investors or socially 
responsible shareholders on one hand and purely financially 
motivated shareholders on the other. The third and final bridge can be 
conceptualized as a “meta-bridge” between canonical schisms of 
profit and social interest. Social-intrapreneurs often attempt to create 
reimagined relationships between their host corporation and society. 
As re-imagined, the corporation’s activities are no longer construed as 
bound by profit, but instead they are bound by their potential to be a 
resilient and viable corporation in a more interconnected world. 
 
154 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 43. 
155 Id. 
156 See supra Part II. 
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A. Stockholder-to-Stakeholder Bridge 
One effect of the tension that exists in the canonical account 
between profit-seeking and social-purpose endeavors is that, because 
the board is viewed primarily as an agent of the shareholders, non-
shareholders or other stakeholders in the corporation are accorded a 
subsidiary status in our existing account. In practice, however, 
directors and management must navigate between all aspects of the 
corporation’s business and often times do consider the impact of their 
decisions along financial and non-financial dimensions. This is not to 
say that managers and directors seek to subordinate the interests of 
stockholders to those of other firm patrons, but rather that they are 
often called upon to balance these various interests as part of their 
decision-making. Social intrapreneurship has utility in this regard. 
Thus, returning to the aforementioned case study of Luis Sota’s 
initiative at CEMEX, with Patrimonio Hoy—which roughly translates 
to “Patrimony Today” or “Savings/Property Today”157—Sota 
identified the external social problem as the lack of affordable 
housing for low-income families in Mexico. Sota’s proposed solution 
was a business model that allowed CEMEX to create building 
material options for low-income builders, which in turn allowed these 
builders to provide low-income families with access to home 
ownership.158 Instead of proposing that CEMEX donate houses or 
building materials to address low-income housing needs (i.e., engage 
in pure philanthropy) or create a CSR program where CEMEX would 
donate some portion of revenue to address these needs each time a 
consumer purchased a CEMEX product, Sota developed a model that 
directly enhanced the company’s financial, as well as its social, 
bottom line. 
Perhaps much of the success of the program has to do with Sota’s 
ability to code-switch between the logic of the local communities in 
Mexico that CEMEX sought to reach and the business logic of 
CEMEX’s business model and operations. Sota spotted the gap 
between these external societal needs and the business opportunity for 
CEMEX. Initially, CEMEX was flummoxed as to how to adapt its 
existing strategies and assets to service these communities.159 As a 
result, CEMEX did something unprecedented. It issued a “Declaration 
 
157 Ajit Sharma, CEMEX: Innovation in Housing for the Poor, MICH. BUS. SCH., Dec. 
12, 2003, at 2; SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39. 
158 See SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39. 
159 See id. 
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of Ignorance” in which it publicly announced that it had identified 
deficiencies in its product offerings, that it had no idea how to correct 
these deficiencies, and that it was willing to disregard its traditional 
approaches to business in order to find a solution.160 
This bold new approach did not at first receive widespread internal 
support, but senior management understood Sota’s vision and they 
forged ahead.161 CEMEX then undertook a unique anthropological 
survey of these local communities, which studied the 
autoconstruccion or “do-it-yourself” model of building in low-income 
communities and sought to identify patterns of building techniques 
and market dynamics.162 As a result of this research, key findings 
emerged that allowed Sota to better see how to reconfigure CEMEX’s 
approach and value chain in a way that was mutually beneficial to the 
company and low-income communities.163 For example, the research 
revealed that the building process in targeted communities was 
characterized by a start-and-top pattern, which often resulted from 
lack of capital to complete construction and/or because of shoddy 
builders, contractors, or engineers who would not see a project 
through to completion.164 Armed with this information, Sota was then 
able to retool CEMEX’s approach to both products and markets, in 
addition to its value chain. CEMEX launched Patrimonio Hoy in 
1999, which is essentially a membership program for low-income 
customers, whereby customers apply in groups of three to become 
members. Membership requires a minimum hour of labor 
commitment, in addition to which they pay a weekly membership fee. 
In return, CEMEX provides a “package” for construction, which 
includes not only the building materials, but also an architect, 
engineer, and contractor.165 
Patrimonio Hoy presents a prime example of how an 
intrapreneurial initiative could serve a gap-filling function between 
stockholder interests and the interests of other constituents.  The 
 
160 See Shared Value Initiative, Patrimonio Hoy: Access to Housing and Finance, 
CEMEX 1, http://sharedvalue.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/Cemex_SVICase_06-08  
-15.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39. 
164 See id; Treasure at the Bottom of the Pyramid, BUS. TODAY (Dec. 11, 2011), 
http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/innovation-cemex/1/20184.html. 
165 See High Impact Social Programs, CEMEX, http://www.cemex.com/Sustainable 
Development/HighImpactSocialPrograms.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2015); Shared Value 
Initiative, supra note 160; SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39. 
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success of Patrimonio Hoy lies in its ability to connect the internal 
competencies of the corporation with the external social needs of the 
low-income housing market. The connection of internal competencies 
to external needs arguably benefits CEMEX’s shareholders as any 
increase in revenue and profits bodes well for their returns. Similarly, 
other constituents of CEMEX are able to reap tangible social 
benefits—the most direct being to members of Patrimonio Hoy who 
stand to gain a home. 
In addition to creating a link between stockholder welfare and the 
welfare of other specific firm patrons like consumers, some social 
intrapreneurial endeavors rely on pan-sector partnerships. Examples 
include Coca-Cola’s water sustainability program (designed to 
address problems of water scarcity) or Danone’s Danone-Grameen 
collaboration (designed to address childhood malnutrition), both of 
which involve pan-sector collaboration across business, state and civil 
society. In the case of Danone-Grameen,166 the Bangladeshi 
government and civil society organizations had identified and 
attempted to address—by their own admissions, unsuccessfully—the 
problem of childhood malnutrition.167 Danone was able to apply its 
know-how and resources on yogurt manufacturing to create and 
deliver a product that was both appealing to children and effective in 
helping to alleviate some of the deficiencies in their diets.168 Without 
the expertise of its civil society partners and the collaboration with the 
Bangladeshi government, Danone would not have had the same type 
of access to understanding of community norms and potential hiccups 
that prior social programs had faced. Similarly, the Bangladeshi 
government and the civil society organizations did not have the 
expertise or know-how to develop a product to address the 
malnutrition need. Social intrapreneur Muhammad Yunus identified 
the need and also identified the prospect of connecting Danone’s 
business potential to the need and expertise of the Bangladeshi 
 
166 See supra Part I. 
167 See Bangladesh: Children and Women Suffer Severe Malnutrition, IRIN (Dhaka) 
(Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.irinnews.org/report/81544/bangladesh-children-and-women   
-suffer-severe-malnutrition. 
168 See Grameen Danone Foods Ltd., DANONE CMTY., http://www.danonecommunities 
.com/en/project/grameen-danone-food?mode=history (last visited Oct. 18, 2015); Asad 
Ghalib et al., Social Responsibility, Business Strategy and Development: The Case of 
Grameen-Danone Foods Limited, 3 AUSTL. ACCT., BUS. & FIN. J. 1, 7–8 (2009), http://ro 
.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=aabfj. 
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government and its NGO partners.169 Through Danone-Grameen, 
Yunus created an interconnected bridge of all three sectors, or in the 
words of Muhtar Kent, CEO of Coca-Cola, Inc., he provided the 
vision for drawing a “Golden Triangle” (i.e., a three-pronged 
connection between business, government, and civil society).170 
The social intrapreneurial initiatives presented in this Part illustrate 
the role of social intrapreneurship as gap-filler between stockholder 
welfare and the welfare of other firm patrons and/or society. The 
initiatives examined attempt to construct a link between stockholder 
welfare and the welfare of others. Social intrapreneurial models are 
often not about reinforcing a subservient relationship between profit 
and social value creation, in either direction, but rather they attempt to 
reimagine the relationship as one of simultaneity rather than as being 
sequential in nature. Put differently, social intrapreneurship is not 
about flouting stockholder value; rather it is very much about 
achieving stockholder value by creating social value. 
B. Shareholder-Shareholder Bridge 
For most publicly traded corporations, there is no single type of 
shareholder. As described in the 2014 article, Shareholder Cultivation 
and New Governance, share ownership is highly heterogeneous with 
different types of shareholders who have a dizzying array of 
investment behaviors, motives, agendas, internal pressures, and 
expectations.171 This heterogeneity creates “for corporations and their 
boards,” what noted practitioner Ira Millstein termed a “‘zoo’ of 
owners with different stripes, teeth, sensors, claws, vision, strength, 
will, and attitudes.”172 Thus, for example, shareholders differ as to 
whether they are natural beings; some shareholders are individuals, 
although most shareholders of record are large institutional 
shareholders. They also differ by the length of their investment 
 
169 James Melik, Danone’s Yogurt Strategy for Bangladesh, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2009, 
7:05 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8100183.stm. 
170 Muhtar Kent, Opinion, The Golden Triangle–Spearheading Change the Smart Way, 
COCA-COLA (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/opinion-the          
-golden-triangle-spearheading-change-the-smart-way#TCCC. 
171 See generally Belinfanti, supra note 11 (discussing the diverse array of shareholder 
preferences in terms of investment horizon and objective). 
172 Ira M. Millstein, Senior Assoc. Dean for Corp. Governance, Yale Sch. of Mgmt., 
Lecture at Charkham Memorial, London, Eng.: Directors and Boards Amidst Shareholders 
with Conflicting Values: The Impact of the New Capital Markets (July 9, 2008) (transcript 
available at https://www.frc.org.uk/FRC-Documents/FRC/Professor-Ira-M-Millstein          
-Lecture.aspx).  
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horizon (short-term, long-term, or somewhere in between) and their 
objectives for investing in the company. Some shareholders are what 
Warren Buffett terms “owner-partners,” meaning that these are 
shareholders who understand the company’s operations, attitudes, and 
expectations and who are less likely to sell their shares, or as Buffett 
terms it, “wiggle[] around daily . . . when some economic or political 
event makes [them] nervous.”173 On the other hand, some 
shareholders fall into what Professor Brian Bushee terms “transient” 
investors who exhibit a high rate of turnover and move in and out of a 
company’s stock.174 Others are so-called “dedicated” shareholders 
who attempt, or whose objective is, to advance their own views of 
some aspect of corporate governance and/or business operations or 
strategy on the board and management, as well as on the other 
shareholders.175 In addition, a relatively new type of shareholder has 
emerged: that of the so-called “high-frequency trader” or “high-speed 
trader.” High-frequency traders use a fully automated trading system 
to “read” the trades of others and to move in and out of securities at a 
rapid speed, often just in milliseconds, and often reaping a handsome 
profit at the expense of the trades that they leaped over.176 As one 
would expect, shareholders who fall under the “high frequency 
trader” umbrella have minimal interest in understanding the business 
of the companies behind the shares (i.e., they are the antithesis of 
Buffett’s “owner-partner” shareholder).177  
Still yet, shareholders differ on how they view the connection 
between a corporation’s profit-seeking activities and its undertaking 
of socially beneficial activities. For shareholders who fall under the 
“impact investor” or “socially responsible” investor banner, socially 
beneficial activities on the part of the company are part of their 
criteria and objective for investing their capital in the corporation. On 
the other hand, shareholders who embrace the pure profit-maximand 
 
173 See WARREN E. BUFFETT, AN OWNER’S MANUAL (1996) (a booklet issued to 
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.’s Class A and Class B shareholders to explain the company’s 
“broad principles of operation”). 
174 Brian Bushee, Identifying and Attracting the “Right” Investors: Evidence on the 
Behavior of Institutional Investors, 16 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 28, 29 (2004). 
175 Id. 
176 See Tamara Belinfanti, Insider Trading 2.0 – Keeping Up With The Super Computer 
Arms Race, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Mar. 19, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com 
/business_law/2014/03/insider-trading-20-keeping-up-with-the-super-computer-arms-race 
.html. 
177 See, e.g., James Sterngold & Jenny Strasburg, For SAC, a Shift in Investing Strategy 
Later Led to Suspicions, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2013, 6:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com 
/articles/SB10001424127887324144304578622300959537068. 
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norm are focused on financial returns, and a focus on the social side is 
either nonexistent or minimal. 
Continuing Millstein’s zoo analogy, unlike a true zoo, where 
everyone recognizes that different animals are indeed different (e.g., it 
would be unwise to feed the conures the same food that is meant for 
the lions), corporate law is yet to fully embrace the realities of 
shareholder heterogeneity. Responses to this heterogeneity have 
mainly been private-ordering in nature. Trends such as proxy-access 
bylaws, which limit eligible shareholders by amount of share 
ownership and length of share ownership, is an example of this type 
of private ordering, as well as various shareholder cultivation 
techniques used by corporations to identify potential “owner-partner” 
shareholders.178 
Social intrapreneurship fits into these private-ordering activities 
because it is very much a practice that is privately negotiated and 
facilitated without explicit legal mandate.179 Moreover, the social-
intrapreneurial focus on connecting profit imperatives to social needs 
potentially helps to soften the divide between various shareholder 
interests. For example, impact investors or socially responsible 
investors, as well as shareholders who fall closer to the profit-
maximand end of the spectrum, could all get behind initiatives like 
Patrimonio Hoy at CEMEX or Microsoft’s Unlimited Potential Group 
initiative. The latter offers affordable technology to low-income 
segments of the population, which has allowed Microsoft to expand 
its reach into emerging markets.180 
C. The Meta-Bridge? Socio-to-Profit? 
As illustrated throughout this Article, many social-intrapreneurial 
initiatives attempt to gap-fill between concepts of profit and social 
interest, and, in fact, it is this bridging between profit and social value 
creation that is at the heart of their success. Notably, Patrimonio Hoy 
has lived up to CEMEX’s financial and business goals, as well as 
 
178 See, e.g., Belinfanti, supra note 11, at 811; Paul Hodgson, At Whole Foods, 
Chipotle, and Others, Shareholders Prepare for Battle, FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2015, 1:00 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2015/02/03 /whole-foods-chipotle-proxy-access/ (providing examples 
from Whole Foods and Chipotle, where the corporations present their own proxy-access 
resolutions). 
179 See generally Robert W. Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm: Partnership Law, 
Corporate Law, and Private Ordering Within Closely-Held Business Associations, 2005 
U. ILL. L. REV. 171, 173 (2005). 
180 See infra Appendix. 
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social goals, with the company convinced the project has increased 
revenues and market shares, and improved the corporate image.181 
Simultaneously, Patrimonio Hoy has provided homes for eight 
hundred thousand families in Mexico and, because of its success, the 
program has been replicated in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the 
Dominican Republic.182 Similarly, Unilever’s initiative provides 
another case in point. On the internal-business side of the equation, 
Unilever estimates that it expanded its market and revenue as a result 
of the Shakti initiative.183 Simultaneously, on the social side, the 
Shakti program has trained approximately seventy thousand women 
entrepreneurs who in turn distribute to four million households that 
were previously unable to access Unilever products.184 Also, consider 
Accenture’s Accenture Development Partnership (ADP), which 
resulted from an intrapreneurial initiative and which links Accenture’s 
core consultancy with its ADP model to create new brokering 
functions that reach new clients and partnerships. 
Establishing socio-profit connectivity through these various 
intrapreneurial initiatives leads to interesting normative as well as 
doctrinal questions. On the normative front, the more companies 
engage in this type of socio-profit bridging, the more the canonical 
corporate law account will be forced to wrestle with the question of 
whether pure profit maximization is the best norm for assessing 
corporate activity and for designing corporate governance rules. Of 
course, one obvious hedge to this question is to expand the definition 
of “profit maximization” to include value-enhancing initiatives such 
as these. Relatedly, in terms of doctrinal concerns, socio-profit 
bridging that allows for simultaneous instead of sequential positive 
contributions to both the financial bottom line and the social bottom 
line will arguably limit the need for the existing temporal divide in 
corporate law doctrine between the “short-term” and the “long-term.” 
This temporal divide is seen in Shlensky v. Wrigley,185 which 
involved a derivative suit over a business decision by the owners of 
 
181 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39; CEMEX, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (2012), 
http://www.cemex.com/InvestorCenter/files/2012/CemexAnnualReport2012.pdf; TED 
LONDON, MICH. ROSS SCH. OF BUS., CEMEX’S PATRIMONIO HOY: AT THE TIPPING 
POINT? 8 (2012). 
182 SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 39. 
183 Emily Mello, Celebrate Solutions: Micro-Entrepreneurship as a Tool for Women’s 
Empowerment, WOMEN DELIVER (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.womendeliver.org/updates 
/entry/celebrate-solutions-micro-entrepreneurship-as-a-tool-for-womens-empowerment. 
184 Id. 
185 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
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the Cubs baseball team not to hold “night games.”186 The board’s 
articulated reason for deciding not to hold night games was that it 
would have a deleterious effect on the surrounding neighborhood.187 
The shareholder-plaintiff attempted to argue that such a rationale was 
invalid because the board was not allowed to make decisions that 
would sacrifice the corporation’s profit.188 The Shlensky court drew a 
distinction between short-term interests and long-term interests. The 
Court opined that in the former, non-profit-seeking initiatives would 
be permitted within the confines of the business judgment rule, but 
that in the long-term, the board would have to demonstrate that their 
undertakings would inure to the financial bottom line.189 This 
temporal divide articulated in Shlensky is a stable feature of corporate 
law jurisprudence and, as then-Chancellor Allen noted, it provides “a 
serviceable, [but potentially] intellectually problematic way, for the 
corporation law to avoid choosing between the alpha of property and 
the omega of relationships.”190 
Successful social intrapreneurship arguably lessens the problem 
because, instead of accepting the status quo of choosing “between the 
alpha of property and the omega of relationships,” it dismantles the 
choice and seeks to forge a more complementary socio-profit 
relationship. 
IV 
POTENTIAL LEGAL CONCERNS 
The existence of social intrapreneurship within a corporation raises 
interesting questions of transparency, accountability, monitoring, and 
the allocation of intellectual property rights.191 Although social 
intrapreneurship does not fall under any one express law or legal 
mandate, social intrapreneurship as a practice does overlay and/or 
intersect with the corporate law framework in several ways. In 
addition to the legal rules and theories analyzed above in Part III, this 
Part considers other points of intersection. 
 
186 Id. at 777–78. 
187 Id. at 778. 
188 Id. 
189 See id. at 779–80. 
190 Allen, supra note 14, at 273. 
191 Additionally, concerns about strategic bargaining, incentive structures, and tax 
consequences are also present in the context of social intrapreneurship. 
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A. Business Judgment Rule and Social Intrapreneurship 
The business judgment rule in corporate law is a long-standing, 
judge-made principle that provides a shield from liability for directors 
in making business decisions when the rule applies.  In Aronson v. 
Lewis, the Supreme Court of Delaware articulated the rule as follows: 
The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the 
managerial prerogatives of [] directors under [the Delaware General 
Corporate Law]. It is a presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, 
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that 
judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party 
challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the 
presumption.192 
Thus, should a host corporation’s board of directors make a 
business decision to allow for the implementation and/or execution of 
social-intrapreneurial initiatives, absent a showing of fraud, illegality, 
“waste,” or bad faith, this decision by the host corporation’s board 
will enjoy deferential protection under the BJR.193 
B. Monitoring Devices–Fiduciary Duty of Oversight and Contractual 
Mechanisms 
Second, even if a board does not make an affirmative business 
decision to permit social intrapreneurship activities (either specific 
ones or in general), the board would still need to comply with what 
are short-handedly referred to as its Caremark duties. In In re 
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Chancery 
Court of Delaware held that a board has a duty of oversight and that 
this duty of oversight required that the board establish “information 
and reporting systems . . . that are reasonably designed to provide to 
senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate 
information sufficient to allow management and the board, each 
within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the 
corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance.”194 
The Chancery Court noted that in order to prove a breach of 
Caremark duties: 
 
192 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984) (citations omitted). 
193 See id. at 812 n.6. 
194 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
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plaintiffs would have to show either (1) that the directors knew or 
(2) should have known that violations of law were occurring and, in 
either event, (3) that the directors took no steps in a good faith effort 
to prevent or remedy that situation, and (4) that such failure 
proximately resulted in the losses complained of . . . .195 
The Caremark standard applies to legal risks; thus, it would apply 
should any intrapreneurial activity cause the host corporation to 
violate the law.196 In terms of intrapreneurial activities that do not 
result in a violation of law, the case of In re Citigroup Inc. 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation is instructive.197 
In Citigroup, the plaintiff alleged that the Citigroup directors had 
breached their duty of oversight by failing to monitor the business 
risks, which ultimately led to Citigroup suffering billions of losses in 
the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis.198 The Citigroup court 
drew a distinction between matters of legal risk and matters of 
business risk. The Court noted that the latter falls squarely within the 
business judgment of the board and, a priori, “the core protections of 
the business judgment rule”;199 thus the presumption could only be 
rebutted by showing gross negligence or bad faith.200 Additionally, 
the court noted that “the mere fact that a company takes on business 
risk and suffers losses—even catastrophic losses—does not evidence 
misconduct, and without more, is not a basis for personal director 
liability.”201 The implication of Caremark and Citigroup on social-
intrapreneurial initiatives is that, while they provide core legal 
boundaries for intrapreneurial endeavors, they simultaneously allow 
broad latitude for a corporation to facilitate intrapreneurship practices 
within the bounds of the fiduciary duty of care. 
For activities that are not illegal but nonetheless potentially 
troublesome (e.g., spending inordinate amounts of the workday 
daydreaming about solving some social problem rather than attending 
to the tasks at hand), as well as for illegal activities, such situations 
can be dealt with ex ante in the employee’s contract. This method 
serves as a private-ordering means of establishing a governance 
mechanism ex ante for problems that could occur ex post. 
 
195 Id. at 971. 
196 See id. at 967. 
197 In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 
2009). 
198 Id. at 111. 
199 Id. at 125. 
200 Id. at 124, 128. 
201 Id. at 130. 
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On this last point, intrapreneurial contractual devices could draw 
on contractual mechanisms employed by universities for research 
employees or used by corporations for employees who develop and/or 
have knowledge of the company’s intellectual property design. For 
starters, social-intrapreneurial innovation typically builds upon 
existing inventions or, in the alternative, establishes “novel and 
radical ideas.”202 
Under the traditional setup in the innovation space, an employee-
inventor owns the patent rights to an invention even if the invention 
was “conceived and/or reduced to practice while the inventor was 
employed” by the corporation.203 However, corporations often ensure 
asset lock-in by requiring employees to enter into contracts that 
expressly vest ownership over such inventions in the corporation-
employer.204 This type of contractual arrangement could be easily 
replicated in the intrapreneurial space. 
Additionally, several strategies used in the broader innovation 
space for incentivizing and rewarding innovation could be adopted 
and tailored to social-intrapreneurial initiatives. Potential strategies 
that could be used to incentivize, retain, and/or reward social 
intrapreneurs include financial rewards (e.g., raises, bonuses, and 
promotions), management-endorsed discretion to alter the 
corporation’s culture, substantial autonomy, and proper allocation of 
resources for developing innovations.205 
 
202 Shannon H. Hedvat, A New Age of Pro-Employer Rights: Are Automatic 
Assignments the Standard?, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 817, 822–23 (2011); see also Wuryan 
Andayani et al., Corporate Social Responsibility, Good Corporate Governance and the 
Intellectual Property: An External Strategy of the Management to Increase the Company’s 
Value, NAT’L CONF. ON MGMT. RES. 2008 (Nov. 27, 2008) (“In the intellectual capital, 
there are intellectual properties which include the income from the patent right, the amount 
of the patents, and the registered design, the value of copyright, the expenditure of R & D, 
house mark, and brand survey. The company which does the R & D, improves its 
information technology, introduces a plan, house mark, and creates a new thing to be 
patented, will obviously improve its way of work, and have the contribution to the 
shareholders, the owners of interests, employees, business partners, and the society. 
Therefore, it is expected that the company which has the intellectual property can improve 
the way of work of the company.”). 
203 Paul C. Van Slyke & Mark M. Friedman, Employer’s Rights to Inventions and 
Patents of Its Officers, Directors and Employees, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 127, 132 (1990). 
204 Id. 
205 See Larry Myler, Intrapreneurs Are Just Like Entrepreneurs. . .NOT!, FORBES (Jan. 
15, 2014, 12:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymyler/2014/01/15/intrapreneurs     
-are-just-like-entrepreneurs-not/. 
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C. The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Social Intrapreneurship 
A third point of interest in terms of legal implications is the ability 
of the market and stockholders to monitor and discipline wayward 
social-intrapreneurial practices. The disciplining of wayward social-
intrapreneurial practices is analogous to the disciplining of any 
internal activity of the corporation. Under the efficient capital market 
hypothesis (ECMH), markets are deemed to be efficient, meaning that 
they reflect all available information about the given corporation in 
the stock price.206 Investors can react to this information by buying or 
selling. This trading by investors serves as a disciplinary tool, because 
a sale of the company’s stock would reflect a disapproval or lack of 
confidence in the corporation’s business.207 
Applying the ECMH framework, the argument would be that if a 
given corporation’s social-intrapreneurship facilitation began to eat 
into or affect the corporation’s value, as reflected in its stock price, 
the market will react by trading out of that corporation’s stock, thus 
exerting discipline on management. Of course, there are two flies in 
the ointment. First, there are problems with the ECMH, as the stock 
price does not always do a good job of reflecting necessary 
information, and thus reliance on ECMH may be overstated. Second, 
even if ECMH were to work perfectly, is social intrapreneurship 
always visible? Meaning, because it involves the voluntary work of 
insiders, and it is work that is not necessarily part of their core 
mandate, there is a reasonable probability that, for at least some 
period of time, these activities will remain hidden from the market. In 
addition, however, to the use of stock price as a disciplinary tool, 
other standard disciplinary tools, such as the potential for managerial 
ouster and the market for takeovers, also still exist as a means of 
market discipline of wayward social intrapreneurship. 
D. Disclosure Rules and Social Intrapreneurship 
A fourth point—that connects to the third—is the role that 
disclosure can play in both keeping the corporation honest and in 
informing the market, thereby enhancing the shareholders’ ability to 
 
206 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976). 
207 See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 206; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 
206. But see Stout, supra note 110. 
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monitor and make decisions. Currently, social-intrapreneurial 
endeavors are not explicitly required to be disclosed under the United 
States securities rules and the regulations by the United States 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). However, should a social-
intrapreneurial initiative evolve to the point where it becomes 
formalized and becomes a significant revenue earner, disclosure could 
be required under United States securities laws.208 Similarly, should 
the initiative be formalized as a separate business segment under 
Regulation S-K, the company would be required to report and provide 
necessary disclosures.209 Also, although not formally required in the 
United States, companies who voluntarily issue social responsibility 
reports or “integrated reports” can take the opportunity to disclose 
successful social-intrapreneurial initiatives therein.210 
E. Shareholder Proposals and Social Intrapreneurship 
A fifth and admittedly more forward-looking connection is the role 
of social intrapreneurship within the Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal 
framework.211 Under Rule 14a-8 of the United States Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 (as amended), shareholders who meet certain 
requirements are entitled to have their proposals included in a 
corporation’s proxy statement for its annual meeting, unless the 
proposal falls under one of the rule’s thirteen substantive grounds for 
exclusion.212 One of the thirteen substantive grounds for exclusion is 
if the proposal relates to “ordinary business.”213 A review of the case 
law and SEC action in this area illustrates that courts and the SEC 
often draw a distinction between proposals involving business matters 
and those that raise issues of public policy. For example, in the case 
of Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit 
held that the Dow Chemical Company could not omit a shareholder 
 
208 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). 
209 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(i) (2015) (requiring disclosure for each business segment 
“for each of the last three fiscal years the amount or percentage of total revenue 
contributed by any class of similar products or services which accounted for 10 percent or 
more of consolidated revenue in any of the last three fiscal years or 15 percent or more of 
consolidated revenue, if total revenue did not exceed $50,000,000 during any of such 
fiscal years.”). 
210 See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, J. 
POL. ECON. 110 (1965). 
211 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2015). 
212 See id. at § 240.14a-8(f)(1). 
213 See id. at § 240.14a-8(i)(7). 
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proposal related to Dow’s production of napalm. The proposal 
requested that the Dow board adopt an amendment to the company’s 
certificate of incorporation to bar the sale of napalm to any buyer 
unless the buyer was able to provide certain assurances.214 The court 
noted that “there [was] a clear and compelling distinction between 
management’s legitimate need for freedom to apply its expertise in 
matters of day-to-day business judgment, and management’s patently 
illegitimate claim of power to treat modern corporations with their 
vast resources as personal satrapies implementing personal political or 
moral predilections.”215 The court further noted that “[i]t could 
scarcely be argued that management is more qualified or more 
entitled to make these kinds of decisions than the shareholders            
. . . .”216 
Similarly, in a 1976 Interpretive Release addressing the Medical 
Committee decision, the SEC noted that there was a distinction 
between proposals that involve ordinary business operations and those 
that involve significant policy implications.217 According to the SEC, 
“proposals of that nature” (i.e., those that have significant social or 
moral implications) while at one time “excludable,” could not be 
excluded because such proposals were “beyond the realm of an 
issuer’s ordinary business operations.”218 
The use of the shareholder proposal mechanism to garner attention 
for social and environmental matters has a long history. If support for 
corporate sustainability as an ideal continues to grow, one would 
expect that shareholder proposals involving social and environmental 
issues would also continue to maintain a presence in the annual 
corporate voting season. The presence of successful social-
intrapreneurial initiatives within a corporation’s operations could 
arguably head off some of these proposals, or conversely, social or 
environmental concerns raised by shareholder proposals could serve 
 
214 432 F.2d 659, 680–81 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated by SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human 
Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). But see Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores, Inc., SEC Staff 
No-Action Letter (Sept. 20, 1994), 1994 WL 511459 (allowing exclusion of proposal 
regarding Cracker Barrel’s discrimination policies). 
215 Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 681. 
216 Id. 
217 Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-12,999 (Nov. 22, 1976) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 34-12,999]; see also 
Keir D. Gumbs & Elizabeth A. Ising, The Shareholder Proposal Process, in A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES § 12.04 (Amy L. Goodman et al. eds., 
5th ed., 2014). 
218 SEC Release No. 34-12,999, supra note 217. 
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as a spark for an intrapreneurial initiative. Put differently, 
intrapreneurship may provide a manageable and practical way for a 
corporation to address reasonable concerns that are expressed through 
the shareholder proposal mechanism. 
V 
THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION AND SOCIAL INTRAPRENEURSHIP 
No account of social intrapreneurship through a corporate law lens 
would be complete without contemplating how the practice of social 
intrapreneurship would be interpreted under various theories on the 
nature of corporations. Not surprisingly, because corporations are not 
homogeneous in terms of patterns of ownership, distribution of rights, 
internal governance structures, and business strategy—to name a 
few—several theories on the nature of the corporation exist. Thus, the 
corporation qua institution has been described in various ways, 
including (1) as a legal entity; (2) as a web of contracts; (3) as an 
aggregate of people; (4) as the property of its shareholders; (5) as a 
team of people; and (6) as a political choice.219 
With respect to social intrapreneurship, the nexus of contract 
theory, the property theory, and the team-production theory are 
particularly salient because they attempt to deal with the complexities 
of internal corporate affairs and competing interests. The balance of 
this Part contemplates the narrative of intrapreneurship under each of 
the theoretical frames of contract, property, and team production.220 
A. Web of Contracts Theory 
Web of contract theorists view the corporation as a web or “nexus” 
of both implicit and explicit contracts among the state, the corporation 
and its shareholders, employees, and customers.221 All are voluntarily 
 
219 See JEFFREY D. BAUMAN & RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, CORPORATIONS LAW AND 
POLICY 17–49 (West eds., 8th ed. 2013); LYNN STOUT, CORPORATE ENTITIES: THEIR 
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND PURPOSE ch. B.VII.3 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 10) (on 
file with author). 
220 For each theoretical frame of contract, property, and team production, this Article 
has deliberately limited the description of each theory to the position taken by proponents 
and has not attempted to capture the range of drawbacks and concerns that agitators of 
each have noted. This choice is mainly driven by concerns of argument efficiency, as well 
as the realization that the general concerns voiced by agitators inherently wend their way 
into the discussion as they manifest as limitations of the specific theory in explaining 
intrapreneurship. 
221 STOUT, supra note 219 (manuscript at 15). 
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engaged in the corporate enterprise.222 For example, in The Economic 
Structure of Corporate Law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel 
posited that “corporate law has an economic structure, [which] 
increases the wealth of all by supplying the rules that investors would 
select if it were easy to contract more fully.”223 Similarly, in The 
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, Professor Henry Butler 
argued that “the corporation [is] founded in private contract, where 
the role of the state is limited to enforcing contracts.”224 The 
influence of the contract theorist approach can also be seen in court 
opinions. For example, in 2010, the Supreme Court of Delaware in 
Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. referred to the 
corporate bylaws as “contracts among a corporation’s 
shareholders.”225 
Under this theory, freedom of contract permits the parties to 
structure their relationships as they choose. A related strand of the 
theory advances the idea that corporate law itself is contractual in 
nature because it supplies a package or “standard form” of terms, 
which in many instances, can be negotiated or “contracted around” to 
produce the optimal contractual arrangement for the particular 
corporation.226 Finally, the web-of-contract literature posits that 
because corporations must compete for investors’ capital, they will 
design governance structures to reduce the risk of management 
overreaching so as to attract investment.227 
Thus, under a nexus of contracts view, social-intrapreneurial 
endeavors could be conceptualized as constituting yet another implicit 
or explicit—depending on the level of formality and endorsement 
exhibited by the host corporation—contractual arrangement between 
the intrapreneur and the host corporation. In terms of the metaphor of 
corporate law as providing a standard form contract,228 one can 
conceptualize profit-maximand principles as functioning as a 
(mandatory?) default term and, relatedly, social intrapreneurship as a 
contracting practice that provides an alternative means of achieving 
 
222 Id. 
223 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW, at vii (1991). 
224 Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. 
REV. 99, 100 (1989). 
225 Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. and Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010). 
226 See Butler, supra note 224, at 119–20 (1989); BAUMAN & STEVENSON, supra note 
219. 
227 BAUMAN & STEVENSON, supra note 219, at 602. 
228 See supra Part II. 
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this default. Finally, as shall be discussed below, the web-of-contract 
framework is helpful in designing mechanisms for addressing 
traditional contract problems that occur within the intrapreneurial 
space, which include problems of shirking, relationship breakdown, 
and contract unwinding. 
One limitation of attempting to understand intrapreneurship from 
the prism of web-of-contracts, is that many web-of-contract theorists 
“dismiss the corporate entity as irrelevant or even nonexistent.”229 
This is problematic for a fulsome account of intrapreneurship because 
successful intrapreneurship depends on the active involvement of the 
corporation itself; not simply as an intangible series of contracts, but 
as a tangible form that has the wherewithal to apply its know-how to 
address a social problem. 
B. Property Theory 
Under property theory of the corporation, shareholders are deemed 
to be the “owners” of the corporation; the corporation “belong[s]” to 
the shareholders, and thus the directors and officers are best 
conceptualized as being “agents” of the shareholder “principals.”230 
By extension, property theorists hold that in carrying out their duties 
as agents of the shareholders, management must be guided by an 
objective of maximizing shareholder value.231 The moment in time at 
which one measures this value, or the means of how best to measure 
the value, is the subject of contentious debate. However, drawing on 
the short-term/long-term bridge, as well as the shareholder-
shareholder and shareholder-stakeholder bridges described above, the 
intrapreneurial narrative under a property theorists view could be 
constructed as follows: successful intrapreneurial initiatives positively 
contribute to the corporation’s financial bottom line, thus increasing 
the shareholder’s return on equity. Moreover, shareholders maintain a 
monitoring role vis-à-vis management and are thus in a position to 
discipline management either through “exit” or “voice” for failed 
initiatives.232 
The limit of property theory in explaining the presence of 
intrapreneurship is that for a property theory purist social 
intrapreneurship could in many ways be viewed as the antithesis of 
 
229 STOUT, supra note 219 (manuscript at 16). 
230 Id. (manuscript at 13). 
231 See supra Part II. 
232 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). 
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the theory’s premise. Property theory views shareholders as the 
principals for whose benefit the corporation should be run, while 
social intrapreneurs by the nature of their work are employing the 
corporation’s resources to address the needs of stakeholders and 
shareholders. One response to this limitation would be to say that 
social intrapreneurship practices inure to stockholder welfare, and 
thus they can be viewed as fulfilling the objective of serving the best 
interest of shareholders. Furthermore, an argument could be made 
under the property-theorist view that best interest of shareholders by 
necessity contemplates meeting the external needs of external 
stakeholders in a manner that benefits the corporation’s financial 
bottom line or at a minimum does not negatively impact the 
corporation’s financial value beyond some reasonable amount. 
C. Team Production Theory 
The team production theory of the corporation “focuses on the role 
corporate entities play in fostering team production, meaning 
production that requires contributions from more than one party.”233 
According to Professors Blair and Stout, who were the first to espouse 
this theory: 
Essential corporate team members (shareholders, employees, and 
others who make company-specific investments) give up property 
rights over the team’s joint output to the corporate entity, which 
“owns” any surplus generated by team production. The corporate 
entity in turn is governed by a board of directors whose members 
cannot keep the surplus for themselves but must choose between 
keeping the surplus in the entity’s name or distributing all or part of 
it to various corporate team members (for example, paying 
dividends to shareholders or larger salaries to employees).  If the 
board’s members want to keep the corporate entity viable so as to 
keep their board positions, they have incentive to use corporate 
surplus to reward various team members as necessary to keep those 
members inside the corporate team.234 
Therefore, according to the team production theory, “corporate 
directors [are] not [viewed] as agents of shareholders, but as a 
governance mechanism designed to encourage and protect specific 
investment in corporate team production.”235 
 
233 STOUT, supra note 219 (manuscript at 17) (citing Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. 
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999)). 
234 Id. (manuscript at 17–18). 
235 Id. (manuscript at 18). 
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Under this theory, social intrapreneurs would thus be 
conceptualized as “team members” whose input or contribution to the 
team include not only what they were initially hired to do but also the 
voluntary intrapreneurial activities that they are now engaged in. For 
corporations that have a formalized intrapreneurial process or who are 
beginning to specifically recruit team members to contribute their 
intrapreneurial talents, the same result holds. Moreover, any surplus 
that results from intrapreneurial activities would become part of the 
corporation’s surplus, and the use of this surplus would fall under the 
discretion of the board as “mediating hierarch.”236 Under the team 
production model, the board is incentivized to partition the surplus to 
reward corporate team members because this is necessary to minimize 
members “quitting” the team. 
Team production theory appears to capture the essence of social-
intrapreneurial practice; although, one potential limitation of the 
theory is that it does not explicitly address how one would deal with a 
wayward intrapreneurial team member. Thus, one could imagine a 
scenario where a team has a member who is an intrapreneur, but who 
deliberately keeps his or her intrapreneurial activities hidden from the 
rest of the team. In the extreme, one could further imagine that these 
hidden activities are actually to the detriment of joint production. 
While team production theory does not explicitly address this 
scenario, one default that team production does provide for dealing 
with these types of scenarios is to refer to the mediating-hierarch 
function of the board. Hence, it would be the board, on a case-by-case 
basis, who would decide how best to handle actions by team members 
that detract from the overall contributions of the team. 
Social intrapreneurship presents various points of intersect with 
corporate law theory, doctrine, statutory rules, and general principles. 
An examination of social intrapreneurship through a corporate law 
frame reveals that the conceptual divide between profit and social 
good need not be as sharp as currently portrayed. 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Social intrapreneurs occupy a unique space within for-profit 
corporations at the intersection of innovation, profit, and social good. 
The hallmark of their work is in identifying a target problem, often 
social in nature, and reconceptualizing the use of corporate resources 
in a manner that inures to the full complement of the proverbial triple 
 
236 See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 233. 
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bottom line. While being close relatives of social entrepreneurs and 
their corporate sustainability counterparts, social intrapreneurs differ 
in one important respect: solving social needs are not part of their 
mandate. Rather, they voluntarily opt to make social need their 
business. While this distinction is potentially beginning to fade the 
more corporations recognize the value of social intrapreneurship and 
the more formalized intrapreneurship becomes, the intrapreneurial 
initiatives studied in this Article all shared this core characteristic of 
volunteerism at the outset. 
While social intrapreneurship is not without its limitations, such as 
problems of shirking, increased monitoring costs on the part of the 
host corporation, or problems of identification, governance, and 
monitoring, incentive structures can be designed to address these 
concerns. In addition, the presence of corporate law fiduciary duties, 
the threat of product or market discipline, and the threat of managerial 
ouster, all serve as potential disciplinary mechanisms against 
inefficient intrapreneurialism. 
Social intrapreneurship offers potential gap-filling benefits for 
today’s corporations. It presents a compelling new imaginary that 
reconceptualizes and expands the boundaries of corporate activity in a 
manner that interweaves concerns of profit and social interest. 
Furthermore, social intrapreneurship arguably has significant policy 
implications. First, it offers a model for traditional C-corporations to 
compete with newer business forms, such as benefit corporations or 
social purpose corporations, which have been explicitly created to 
address the profit-public interest divide. Second, social 
intrapreneurship is a means for keeping socially conscious employees 
in the corporate sector rather than crowding them out. Third, social 
intrapreneurship provides a more organic, advanced, and arguably 
more sustainable approach to the profit-public interest divide than 
CSR initiatives or other corporate philanthropic endeavors. Fourth, 
and perhaps most important for this Article, is that social 
intrapreneurs help corporations navigate the axiomatic divide between 
profit and public interest. This latter point has implications for the 
broader policy discussions that are occurring primarily outside of law: 
on the unaddressed needs and untapped potential of nonconventional 
markets, the so-called “bottom of the pyramid,” and the advantages of 
trisector (state/private/nonprofit) coordination. 
To be clear, this Article does not make a normative claim that 
profit and social interest should be aligned. Nor that stockholder 
welfare should be subsumed to the interests of others. And nor does it 
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make a Panglossian claim that profit and public interest can perfectly 
coexist. Instead, it makes a more modest and achievable claim that 
social intrapreneurship provides a discrete and practical approach for 
bridging profit and social interest, and, as a result, it has key 
implications for the broader corporate-purpose debate. Social 
intrapreneurs’ value-focused innovation is a means of modernizing 
their host firm’s approach to society at large, broadening the firm’s 
appeal towards future innovators joining the work force. Finally, 
social intrapreneurship offers to the corporation and to society 
potential advantages that are not necessarily present in other socially 
focused corporate activities, such as charitable contributions, 
corporate philanthropy, or stand-alone CSR initiatives. 
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APPENDIX237 
Organization Intrapreneur Insight Socio-Profit Impact 
Allianz Michael 
Anthony 
Created method to 
provide the 
“bottom of the 
pyramid” with 
insurance, 
including accident, 
life, and health. 
Business: The Micro-
Insurance model expanded 
Allianz’s market share with 
over two million customers 
globally. 
Societal: Offering 
insurance packages to 
individuals that could not 
normally receive such 
protections but face natural 
disasters, such as Tsunamis. 
Accenture Gib Bulloch Created a 
nonprofit 
consulting model 
called Accenture 
Development 
Partnerships 
(ADP) that 
worked in concert 
with Accenture’s 
main business 
model. 
Business: Accenture linked 
its core consultancy with 
ADP’s model to create new 
brokering functions that 
further develops clientele 
and partnerships. 
Societal: By combining 
Bulloch’s nonprofit 
consultancy with its 
existing model, Accenture 
can develop the value of 
clients with societal impacts 
through public/private 
partnerships. 
CEMEX  Luis Sota Created a solution 
to address low-
income housing 
needs by taking 
cement, CEMEX’s 
existing consumer 
product offering, 
and developing a 
model called 
Patrimonio Hoy to 
address local 
needs. 
Business: Faced with 
increased market 
competition, the launch of 
Patrimonio Hoy allowed 
CEMEX to enter into a new 
business segment, low-
income homebuilders, and 
became CEMEX’s most 
profitable segment, making 
up 35% of Mexico’s total 
market for cement. 
Societal: Since Patrimonio 
Hoy’s launch, CEMEX has 
helped nearly eight hundred 
 
237 This table is adapted from “The Yunus Inside”—How Social Intrapreneurs Create 
and Blend Societal and Business Value, along with intrapreneurs identified in the 
SustainAbility report and stories based on research of the Aspen Institute’s First Movers 
program. See Heiko Spitzeck, “The Yunus Inside”—How Social Intrapreneurs Create and 
Blend Societal and Business Value, tbl.2 (Dec. 14, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1725254; SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1; Aspen Institute First 
Movers, supra note 17.  
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Organization Intrapreneur Insight Socio-Profit Impact 
thousand low-income 
families in Mexico own 
homes, and the company 
plans to expand the model 
in additional countries. 
Coca-Cola Dan Vermeer Created a water 
sustainability 
initiative utilizing 
Coca-Cola’s 
global brand 
recognition and 
business system. 
Business: Since water is 
crucial to Coca-Cola’s 
products, reducing the risk 
of water scarcity is critical 
to Coca-Cola’s future 
success and operations. 
Societal: Under Coca-
Cola’s global reach, the 
initiative provides a forum 
for best practices as well as 
risk- and value-sharing 
solutions to address water 
sustainability. 
Dow 
Chemicals 
Dawn 
Baker238 
Created 
connection 
between internal 
leadership 
development and 
sustainable 
business models as 
part of Dow’s 
Human Capital 
Planning and 
Development 
team. 
Business: The approach 
builds Dow’s succession 
capability and contributes 
to the company’s people 
and organizational goals in 
key employee-related 
fields, including Human 
Resources Development 
and Training and 
Workforce Planning. 
Societal: This innovative 
method allows Dow to 
combine its power of 
science and technology to 
innovate what Dow views 
as important for human 
progress and development. 
General 
Electric 
Jonathan 
Murray239 
Founded GE’s 
Research Circle 
Technology 
business as a way 
of utilizing the 
company’s 
Business: Through the 
Research Circle 
Technology business, GE 
provides new solutions to 
the health care industry. 
Societal: By providing 
 
238 2012 Class of Aspen Institute First Mover Fellows, ASPEN INST., http://www.aspen 
institute.org/sites/default/files/content/upload/2009-2014_First_Mover_Projects.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
239 GE Launches Company to Enhance Development of Innovative Technology in 
Collaboration with Leading Scientists, BUSINESS WIRE (Sept. 9, 2011, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110909005844/en/GE-Launches-Company    
-Enhance-Development-Innovative-Technology#.VF0muZPF800. 
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Organization Intrapreneur Insight Socio-Profit Impact 
scientists to 
facilitate open 
innovation.  
tools, services, and 
solutions, the open-
innovation initiative allows 
researchers to discover 
potentially life-saving 
knowledge faster. 
Microsoft Orlando Ayala Launched the 
Unlimited 
Potential Group to 
offer affordable 
technology to low-
income market 
segments.  
Business: By developing 
technologies that are 
available and affordable in 
low-income and less-
developed countries, 
Microsoft is expanding its 
potential for future growth; 
additionally, its worldwide 
partners allow for 
collaboration, and future 
developers within the 
corporation now consider 
low-cost computer 
compatibility when 
developing new 
technologies. 
Societal: Expanding 
technologies into less-
developed countries fosters 
education, innovation, and 
job opportunities. 
Nike Sam 
McCracken 
Created a way for 
the brand to 
expand into new 
business territory 
that leverages the 
power of the Nike 
brand with the 
goal of driving 
athleticism in the 
Native American 
community.  
Business: With its Native 
American Business, Nike 
expands its revenue stream, 
reputation, and competitive 
edge. 
Societal: By expanding the 
business into the Native 
American community, Nike 
continues promoting 
physical fitness worldwide. 
Pepsi Amy Chen240 Created the Food 
for Good program 
to leverage Pepsi’s 
food and beverage 
expertise to solve 
Business: In addition to 
building trust and equity 
with consumers, the 
program acts as a research 
and development incubator 
 
240 Emily Bosland, How to Change the World and Still Pay Your Bills, FORBES (Jan. 
22, 2013, 1:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2013/01/22/how-to-change-the    
-world-and-still-pay-your-bills/; see also Amy Chen, Food for Good, ASHOKA 
CHANGEMAKERS, http://www.changemakers.com/intrapreneurs/entries/food-good-pepsico 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
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nutrition issues in 
underserved 
communities. 
to foster new, low-cost 
technologies to improve 
Pepsi’s business. 
Societal: Since its creation 
in 2009, the program has 
provided over one million 
meals to at-risk youth 
throughout the country. 
P&G Win Sakdinan Created the Future 
Friendly initiative 
that educates 
consumers on 
sustainability 
practices through 
the use of P&G’s 
products. 
Business: By educating 
consumers on green-
friendly practices through 
the use of P&G brand 
products, the initiative 
increases both the 
availability of sustainable 
products as well as P&G’s 
business. 
Societal: The Future 
Friendly initiative paves the 
way for future business 
leaders with a focus on 
sustainability, as well as a 
sustainability strategy that 
benefits consumers and the 
environment. 
Siemens Mark Siebert Created 
information 
technology 
solutions for 
“corporate 
greening,” citizen 
participation, and 
e-democracy (its 
“IT4 Sustainability 
Solution”). 
Business: Following its 
creation, the German 
Government now invests in 
new forms of online 
participation, expanding the 
market on a global scale. 
Societal: The IT4 
Sustainability Solution 
allows citizens to use the 
Internet to participate in 
democracy. 
Starbucks Sue 
Mecklenburg 
Created a 
comprehensive 
program that 
connects the 
quality of 
Starbucks’s 
products with 
social, economic, 
and environmental 
standards. 
Business: Through this new 
approach to supply chain 
management and best 
practices, Starbucks ensures 
the quality and responsible 
procurement of its products. 
Societal: The program sets 
forth key opportunities for 
enhancing the livelihood of 
its suppliers while reducing 
their environmental 
footprint. 
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Timberland Michael 
Fischer 
Created a tool for 
measuring 
emissions, 
tracking, and 
modeling to 
manage emissions 
from global 
transportation of 
the brand’s 
products. 
Business: Utilizing the 
Supply Chain Emission 
Tracking tool reduces costs 
associated with off-setting 
carbon emissions and 
potential carbon taxes. 
Societal: By recognizing its 
carbon emissions, 
Timberland now reduces its 
emissions through 
optimizing global 
transportation of its 
products. 
Unilever Santiago 
Gowland 
Created an 
opportunity to 
engage consumers 
and market 
influencers in the 
conversation about 
sustainability 
through “Brand 
Imprint” 
assessments. 
Business: The “Brand 
Imprint” assessments of 
fourteen Unilever brands 
incorporated its core 
business competencies in a 
way that results in positive 
brand innovation and 
impact. 
Societal: To introduce 
consumers to the 
sustainability conversation 
and use Unilever’s impact 
to leverage engagement. 
 
 
